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Societal risks to disasters are continually increasing and the scope of policy issues
surrounding emergency management in the United States remains inundated with a
number of challenges. Examining the connection between social capital and political trust
is paramount as prior studies have documented that if communal networks are disrupted,
there will be a lasting negative impact upon the community. As such, there are specific
events that cause added strain which make certain time periods for examining levels of
resiliency relevant. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill that occurred on April 20, 2010,
represents a large-scale, technological disaster. Not only was there a loss of human life,
but a number of social and political impacts also exist with the oil having spewed out into
the water. For instance, residents living along the Northern Gulf Coast do represent a
heterogeneous population, which span across several geographical boundaries and
represent a diverse range of cultures. Further, the economic interests of impacted
residents were also likely torn between the oil and gas industry and the fishing and
seafood industry, given that many individuals may have been concurrently employed fulltime as oil rig workers and supplemented their financial income and/or quality of life as

commercial fishermen. The goal of this research is to investigate how social capital and
political trust significantly affect communal resiliency among those impacted by the oil
spill. Results from this study will extend the limited understanding on the role of disaster
responsibility in emergency management. Findings reveal that group belonging as related
to race, education, and income significantly impact quality of life and trust in government
which, in turn, influences the perception of disaster responsibility. Specifically, when
trust goes down, a higher percentage of respondents indicate that the victims themselves
should assume the majority of responsibility for taking care of themselves and their
families following a disaster. Perhaps, individuals who are the least trusting or most
cynical of the federal government feel that victims are better off taking care of
themselves and their families in the aftermath of disaster given the storied history of
disaster response.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Societal risks to disasters are continually increasing. Each year, the United States
(US) faces a series of natural and man-made disasters that cause hundreds of deaths and
cost billions of dollars. In 2010 alone, the international community witnessed countless
disasters, killing approximately a “quarter million people,” resulting in “the deadliest
year in more than a generation” (Bell and Borenstein, 2010). Even if the probability or
intensity of such risks remains fairly constant, population growth, alongside economic,
infrastructural, and technological development will inherently result in a concomitant
increase in places prone to disasters (Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola, 2008). Although
“[m]odern society relies on the effective functioning of [critical infrastructure and
resources] to provide public services, enhance quality of life, sustain private profits and
spur economic growth,” the potential for systems to breakdown or resources to become
limited has an unavoidably increased propensity during times of imminent crises (Boin
and McConnell, 2007, p50). Put differently, the protection of material assets and
resources is essential for the successful functioning of government and an economy. The
identification of hazards and assessment of risks often characterize the response and
recovery environment to disasters and, thus, the development of emergency management
capabilities (Mushkatel and Weschler, 1985; McLoughlin, 1985). Still, risks to disasters
persist though their effects can be minimized by knowing and understanding hazards
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posed. Because of their “scale and magnitude, governments attempt to ‘manage’ the
impact of these events and prevent, or at least mitigate, their disastrous consequences”
(Wallace and DeBalough, 1985, p134).
The Deepwater Horizon (DwH) oil spill represents a large-scale, technological
disaster with catastrophic risks. Not only was there a loss of human life, but a number of
and competing communal impacts exist with the oil having spewed out into the water
(Burdeau #1, 2010; Burdeau #2, 2010). For instance, residents living along the Northern
Gulf Coast represent a heterogeneous population, which span across several geographical
boundaries and represent a diverse range of cultures. The economic interests of impacted
residents were also likely torn between the oil and gas industry and the fishing and
seafood industry, given that many may have been concurrently employed as oil rig
workers and supplemented their financial income and/or quality of life as commercial
fishermen. Variations group belonging and disaster experience tend to influence policy
values.
Contextual Background
The explosion of the, Transocean owned and British Petroleum (BP) operated,
DwH oil drilling platform opened a massive oil release in the Gulf of Mexico, just 50
miles south of Venice, Louisiana. The incident, notably referred to as the Macondo
Blowout, occurred ironically late night on Earth Day, Tuesday, April 20, 2010. The Coast
Guard immediately responded by evacuating rig workers (Argus, 2010; Associated Press,
2010). Although eight workers were injured in the explosion, 11 remained missing until
the rig sank two days later on April 22. The search was then called off and the missing
workers were presumed dead. In addition to loss of human life, about 700,000 gallons of
2

diesel fuel went down with the rig, and barrels of oil that had already been pumped went
missing. Though at first the Coast Guard said the initial oil slick was residual oil from the
sunken rig, remotely operated vehicles revealed that the oil was probably a combination
of residual oil and oil leaking from the well itself (Burdeau #1, 2010). Disaster response
teams and cleanup crews immediately mobilized and began utilizing several techniques
to try and contain the growing oil spill.
Initial reports have described efforts to clean up the oil and plug leaks brought
about by the Macondo Blowout. First, Louisiana and Mississippi state authorities
positioned oil booms around the spill site and coastline to prevent the oil from spreading.
Some crews even tried burning some of the oil off the slick. Second, Transocean
immediately began to ship additional rigs to the area to stop the release and inject a heavy
fluid to stop oil or gas from flowing by creating a relief well in the case the blowout valve
could not be turned on (Brennan and Burke, 2010; OSHA #1, 2010). Third, BP tried
utilizing robotic submarines to seal off the well and place a dome over it as to funnel the
leaking oil on to boats for recovery and treatment (Goddard, 2010). Though a
containment dome can ideally recover up to 125,000 barrels of oil; however, it soon
failed after gas crystallized and began to build up on the dome. Therefore, a smaller dome
was built in order to try and control the release (Seba, 2010). So, in continuing efforts, BP
announced several new ideas for plugging the well, including pumping methanol through
a smaller dome so the crystallized hydrates do not form again, pumping rubber scraps and
other debris into the blowout preventer, installing a new blowout preventer on the well,
and cutting the leaking pipe and installing a larger one to divert the oil flow to surface
ships (Bolstad, 2010; Seba, 2010; Weber and Smith, 2010). Finally, BP completed
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drilling a relief well into the outer casing of the bottom of the well, and the company
began pumping cement into the well through a relief well (Schmollinger and Polson,
2010). This ultimately led to the sealing of the well which stopped the oil from further
contaminating the water.
The DwH oil platform was praised for setting a world record of drilling 35,000
feet; yet, tactics to shut off the well releasing the oil proved difficult because it was
stationed about 5,000 feet underneath the water’s surface (Burdeau #1, 2010; Burdeau #2,
2010). It wasn’t until nearly six months later, on Sunday, September 19, 2010, when
announcements confirmed that the oil well was effectively dead. When the plug was
filled as a result of pumping cement into the well’s annulus, the space between the well’s
steal casing and outer walls (CNN News, 2010). Upon its blast, the DwH oil rig issued a
massive column of flame (Murray, 2010). It has, therefore, been speculated that the
explosion was caused due to the rig not having a blowout preventer. A blowout is “an
uncontrolled flow of gas, oil, or other well fluids into the atmosphere or into an
underground formation. A blowout, or gusher, can occur when formation pressure
exceeds the pressure applied to it by the column of drilling fluid” (Oil Gas Glossary,
2010). In drilling, fluids buried in the earth under pressure push against the drilling fluid
pressure. If the pressure of the buried fluids exceeds that of the drilling fluid pressure, the
chance of a blowout increases. A blowout preventer consists of one or more valves
attached to the well head to maintain pressure in the ring of space between the casing and
the drill pipe or the empty hole. Blowout preventers come in two forms: annular and ram.
Annular blowout preventers fill the ring of space between the pipe and well or the well
itself. Rams cut off pressure on holes with or without pipes and can fit different drilling
4

components. Regardless of each, if drilling fluids buried in the earth under pressure
exceed that of the drilling fluid pressure, the chance of a blowout increases (OSHA #2,
2010). And, though it has been suggested that the massive oil spill was caused as a result
of the residual oil from the sunken rig, remotely operated vehicles have revealed that the
oil spill was probably a combination of residual oil from the impact as well as oil leaking
from the well itself (Burdeau #1, 2010; Burdeau #2, 2010; Goddard, 2010).
After initial response to the blowout, Transocean held a conference call with
several industry experts, including Haliburton, Cameron International Corporation (CIC),
and Smith International, for a technical and legal discussion on the incident in light of
President Barack Obama holding BP responsible for the accident (Smith and Breed,
2010; OSHA #1, 2010; Bolstad, Washburn, and Lebovich, 2010). Transocean concluded
that each should have limited financial liability in the oil release. This conclusion caused
a debate between the companies. Although BP had to pay its own money to fund the
cleanup since outside insurance does not cover oil spills, one of the most contentious
issues included whether or not Haliburton had installed the final cement plugs by the time
of the explosion (Herron, 2010; Morgan Stanley, 2010). Halliburton provided many of
the services on the rig including pressure control of the underground oil and gas, in which
drilling contractors are particularly sensitive to three key clauses, and they write contracts
in such a way that liability lies with the oil company for: 1) pollution due to oil coming
from the well or blowout, 2) reservoir damage, and 3) loss of production; under this
contract, the drilling contractor is likely not liable (Urbina, 2010). Also, Transocean had
CIC build the blowout preventer, but if the blowout preventer failure caused the incident,
then Transocean would likely maintain liability. Experts say that the blowout preventer
5

failure was likely a result of the explosion, which would also clear Transocean. This is
possible because the cement plugs, installed by Haliburton, were not properly sealed. It is
also possible that the cement mixture was executed improperly; however, that would be
very difficult to prove. Regarding Smith International’s role in the Macondo Blowout,
there is a remote possibility that improper mud density caused a loss of hydrostatic
pressure, and if this is the case, would still not likely bear any liability (Smith and Breed,
2010).
Problem Statement
Emergency management is regarded as “the process of developing and
implementing policies” concerned with disaster planning (Petak, 1985, p3). Yet, the
scope of issues surrounding emergency management policy remains inundated with a
number of challenges (Waugh, 2000). Inclination among policymakers is to view
emergency management from a proactive approach. One of the greatest barriers to
emergency management is the inability to grasp the social and political context of
hazards. The “rarity of disasters, and thus of opportunities to gain the depth and breadth
of experience necessary for an ‘all-hazards’ response capability, represents a significant
constraint” (Paton and Jackson, 2002, p115). Additionally, most emergency management
lessons learned and best practices examine the biophysical processes of disasters rather
than the cultural aspects (Weichselgartner, 2001). If communal networks are disrupted,
there will be a lasting impact on the social cohesion of the community, the political
confidence among the individuals, and, ultimately the communal resilience of the
impacted area. Community resiliency is the capability for a community to effectively
prepare for, respond to, as well as recover from an adverse event (Patterson, Weil, and
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Patel, 2010). Disasters are “among the most dramatic events… [yet they] are low priority
public problems until the moment they strikes” (Birkland, 1996, p221). While there has
been a wealth of research conducted on the social construction of reality and the placeidentify construct, little research has focused on the responsiveness to such focusing
events as disasters (Vigoda, 2002).
Purpose and Need
Fundamental disaster planning is a complex process (Mushkatel and Weschler,
1985). The identification of hazards and assessment of risks often characterize the
planning environment to disasters and, thus, the development of emergency management
capabilities (Mushkatel and Weschler, 1985). Since disasters are typically dynamic and
fluid in nature, there is a need for an improved means of understanding not only the
governmental but also the communal response to disasters (Gregory, McDaniels, and
Fields, 2001). Examining the connection between social capital and political trust is
paramount as a lessening of social capital undermines political trust and, therefore,
potentially leads to governmental alienation. Disaster planning, thus, needs to be
evaluated in terms of decisional premises so that a more comprehensive model of social
and political resiliency can be developed (Brandsen, Boogers, and Tops, 2006).
Research Questions
Since disasters are typically dynamic and fluid in nature, there is a need for an
improved means of understanding not only the governmental but also the human response
to disasters and its affect on the planning process. This study investigates if failing to
appreciate the importance of building social capital and maintaining trust significantly
7

affected the collective resiliency of the Gulf Coast community in light of the DwH oil
spill. By applying construction theory, this research provides new insights into what
influences public attitudes, beliefs, and practices regarding perceptions of disaster impact
and responsibility (Paton and Johnston, 2001; Paton and Johnston, 2006; Smith and
Dowell, 2000). Specifically, it aims to answer the following two questions:
1. “How does social capital and political trust influence public perception of
disaster responsibility,” and
2. “How does public perception of disaster responsibility affect disaster
policymaking?”
Results from this study will extend the limited understanding on communal
resiliency as relating to the role of accountability in disaster policymaking.
Organization of Study
This study will be divided into six chapters, including this introductory chapter
which establishes the problem, background, and need of this research. Chapter two
reviews the literature on the etiology of disasters, risk and vulnerability to hazards,
evolution of disaster planning, and emergency management practices. Chapter three
discusses the theoretical framework used in this research that is rooted in social capital
and political trust theory and provides supporting other information. Chapter four
presents the materials and methodology utilized in collecting and evaluating population
survey research. Chapter five examines the statistical measures and results used to
analyze this research. And, chapter six reviews how population survey research can
inform practice and scholarship in disaster planning and policymaking as well as provide
recommendations for future disaster research.
8

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Hazard Etiology
Hazards are sources of danger that could lead to an emergency situation and pose
a threat to life, health, property, or the environment. Natural hazards are hazards that exist
within the natural environment and are considered acts of God, and consist of
atmospheric, geologic, hydrologic, seismic, and biologic agents (Steinberg, 2000). They
are thought be unpreventable and are associated with a perceived lack of control.
Manmade hazards are the result from human intent, negligence, error, or involving a
failure of a man-made system, and consist of sociological and technological hazards.
They are not considered predictable although thought to be preventable; hence, their
association with a perceived loss of control (Abbot, 2004; Haddow, Bullock, and
Cappola, 2008). Waugh (2000) notes that while natural disasters includes floods,
earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, tornadoes, avalanches, etc., manmade disasters include
civil defense, terrorism, hazardous materials accidents, fires, structural failures, nuclear
accidents, and transportation disasters. As a result, the ability to manage risk to such
hazards greatly varies due to differences in background. Therefore, the identification of
hazards is the foundation of effectively dealing with and avoiding risks.
Risk is the susceptibility to death, injury, damage destruction, disruption,
stoppage, etc. There are three main types of risks that represent a continuum of intensity.
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First, dormant risks have the potential to be hazardous, but no people, property, or the
environment is currently in harm’s way. Second, armed risks are when people, property,
or the environment may potentially be in harm’s way. And third, active risks are harmful
incidents involving a hazard that has actually occurred. While it may be possible to
alleviate some risk to natural and manmade disasters, continued increase in the global
population alongside infrastructural development will likely result in an increased risk to
hazards (Haddow, Bullock, and Cappola, 2008).
Risk Perception
People evaluate risks contextually. People interpret risks through their own
experiences and biases, and there are marked individual differences in how people react
under stressful situations. Not only does an individual’s personality affect their regard for
decision-making to risks, but also their health level with regard to physical fitness,
fatigue susceptibility, and psychological wellbeing. “Consequently, little consideration
has been given to understanding the specific stressors likely to affect them or their
implications for their thinking and management skills when responding to a disaster”
(Paton and Fin, 1999, p261). Changing risk perception is, thus, difficult. Whereas
objectively-based risk perception relies on facts, numbers, and research, subjectivelybased risk perception relies on publics without expert knowledge interpreting the
situation through their values and experience (Center and Jackson, 2008). Risks are,
therefore, intensified predominantly by two demographic factors. Social factors include,
but are not limited to, race, gender, age, education, religion, ideology, location, health,
and culture, whereas economic factors include, but are not limited to, incurred debt,
credit access, income sources, reserved funds, wealth distribution, and business
10

continuity (Haddow, Bullock, and Cappola, 2008; McEntire, 2006). Risk management is
the process of persuading individuals, who oppose countermeasure actions to risk, to
allow the execution of the action despite the risk. As such, communication means in
which influence vulnerable groups can, too, greatly differ. A minimum is set for risk
acceptability. If a risk is greater than the threshold, action occurs; otherwise the original
behavior remains. According to Center and Jackson (2008), risk communication needs to
be proactive, aim to improve knowledge, and, ultimately, change perceptions and
behaviors. The format of a risk message readily forms risk perception. People will react
similarly to two different pieces of risk information as long as the format they are
presented in is the same. Further, people adjust their behavior if a highly threatening
situation exists or is perceived.
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is the determination of value of risk, in terms of quantitative or
qualitative measures, related to a concrete situation and/or a recognized threat (Haddow,
Bullock, and Cappola, 2008). Expressed, quantitatively, risk assessment is the likelihood
of occurrence times the seriousness if an incident occurred. Expressed qualitatively,
however, risk assessment is the process of 1) identifying and characterizing hazards; 2)
evaluating hazards for severity and frequency; 3) estimating risks associated with
hazards, 4) determining acceptable levels of risk to hazards; 5) determining both the
direct and indirect societal effects of hazard; and 6) identifying risk reduction
opportunities. Still, part of the difficulty of assessing risk is that measurement of potential
loss and probability of occurrence can be very difficult (Haddow, Bullock, and Cappola,
2008; Weichselgartner, 2001). The chance of error in the measurement of these two
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concepts can, therefore, be large. A risk with a large potential loss and a low probability
of occurring is often treated differently from one with a low potential loss and a high
likelihood of occurring. In theory, both are of nearly equal priority, but in practice it can
be very difficult to manage when faced with the scarcity of time and resources.
Disaster Relief
Disasters are deadly, destructive, and disruptive events that occur when a hazard
interacts with human risk and vulnerability. Disaster relief has existed since the early
1800s. It was 1803 when rampant fires spread across Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
During this time, the 7th Congress passed a number of measures waiving duties and tariffs
on goods to provide relief for city merchants. It was not until the start of the Great
Depression that the federal government took a broader stance on disaster relief when
President Hoover commissioned the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932
permitting the feds to lend money to banks and institutions in order to stimulate economic
activity. Years later, between 1960 and 1979, federal disaster relief was provided through
the creation of the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, under the umbrella of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (FEMA, 2010; Haddow, Bullock, and
Cappola, 2008).
Emergency and disaster relief activities were still fragmented. It was not until
1979 when President Carter signed Executive Order 12148 creating the Federal
Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) commissioned with coordinating all
disaster relief efforts. The order merged many of the once separated agencies charged
with varying federal disaster-related responsibilities. Additionally, it transferred over
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civil defense responsibilities from the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (Lindell,
Prater, and Perry, 2007; Waugh, 2000).
Evolution of FEMA
Upon its inception, FEMA responded to a number of disasters, both natural and
manmade. These disasters ranged from the dumping of toxic wastes at Love Canal, the
Cuban Refugee crisis, a nuclear meltdown at Three Mile Island, the Loma Prieta
Earthquake, and Hurricane Hugo. It was not until Hurricane Andrew hit in the summer of
1992 that national attention was focused upon FEMA. The hurricane left 200,000 people
homeless and 1.3 million people without power. Food, clean water, shelter, and medical
assistance were absent the first three days after the disaster. When FEMA did arrive, what
has been referred to as organizational ineptitude delayed relief efforts even more, as food
and water distribution centers could not meet the overwhelming need. More so, FEMA
funding to the response was only $1.8 billion to the $43.6 billion estimated property loss
and damages. After further congressional investigation, it was found that FEMA was
spending 12 times more funding for civil defense “black operations” than for actual
disaster relief. Furthermore, only members with top security clearance knew about the
$1.3 billion annual expenditures for non-disaster activities. The investigation also found
that FEMA had more than 300 sophisticated mobile units with extensive communication
and power systems; yet, they were never employed for disaster relief. Although FEMA
dealt more so with disasters, FEMA still had an underlying mission of providing nuclear
fallout shelters and other civil defense measures. It was only after this period of time that
FEMA redirected it activity base to not only include but employ an all-hazards approach,
and did so fairly successfully for the next several years. It was not until 2001, when the
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September 11 Terrorist Attacks shocked the nation, that disaster planning activities once
again shifted back towards civil defense and away from natural disasters. A year later, in
2002, the Department of Homeland Security was established that merged more than 20
agencies and offices. Shortly thereafter, FEMA, once again, became under public
scrutiny in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. While many people have argued that the
merging FEMA under Homeland Security made it ineffective, demoralized civil servants,
led to decreased funding, and left it led with unqualified political appointees, others
disagree (FEMA, 2014; Haddow, Bullock, and Cappola, 2008; Lindell, Prater, and Perry,
2007).
Disaster Planning
Disaster planning is the process of avoiding risks to hazards and dealing with
disasters in an effort to lessen their impact. According to Petak (1985), it is the essential
role of government to implement policies that effectively manage events of significance
and their associated consequences. Still, the magnitude and character of disasters are not
easily calculated (Boin and McConnell, 2007). There is a recurring problem in disaster
planning as there are long-standing deficiencies in its strategic and operational
approaches (Perry and Lindell, 2003). Paton and Jackson argue that the implementation
of disaster policies have proven problematic, for the “rarity of disasters, and, thus, of
opportunities to gain the depth and breadth of experience necessary for effective allhazards response capability, represents a significant constraint” (2002, p115). Kouzmin,
Alan and Rosenthal (1995) also maintain that the evident excess of operational autonomy
in agencies charged with disaster-related functions and responsibilities have been
problematic, noting that “crisis decision making often involves the same kind of give14

and-take compromise as in routine administration. Indeed, many emerging crisis episodes
or events seem to pose acute dilemmas for choosing between equally defensible courses
of action; often represented by different [entities] involved in crisis events” (p27). And,
Hill asserts that emergency management is varied and flexible, so the underlying aim of
the [strategic] planning process should be to develop flexible arrangement which should
enable any organization to deal effectively with a major or minor emergency, whether
foreseen or unforeseen (1998).
Emergency Management
There are four traditionally agreed upon disaster planning phases that occur in a
cycle. Mitigation, the first phase, includes taking measures to prevent future emergencies
from occurring or minimizing their negative effects. Preparedness, the second phase,
includes developing plans or making preparations to save lives and to help response and
rescue operations in the event of an emergency. Response, the third phase, includes
actions taken to save lives and prevent further property damage in an emergency
situation. Recovery, the fourth and final stage, includes actions taken to return to a
normal or an even safer situation following an emergency (Haddow, Bullock, and
Cappola, 2008). Still, emergency management has been based predominantly upon
reactive models, thereby causing a lack of coordination between the various agencies
involved in the disaster planning phases (McLoughlin, 1985). Disaster planning has
typically focused on post-crisis response and recovery lessons learned from civil defense
events (Waugh, 2000). Yet, frameworks considering risk assessment and disaster
contingency are especially important measures for preparedness and mitigation (Wallace
and DeBalough, 1985). Smith and Dowell (2000) note that each disaster makes available
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incident information; “that is, a temporary configuration of otherwise disparate resources,
[such as people, technologies, and procedures] drawn from many agencies” (p1154).
Given the limited opportunities for an actual disaster-related experience, the
“decision-making, mental models, and situational awareness research on [crises] have
highlighted a further need for effective emergency management training that reflects
operational diversity with collaborative exercises and simulations” (Paton and Jackson,
2002, p115). Additionally, not only are the various interrelationships in emergency
management and complexity of disaster phases between each relationship are massively
confusing, it becomes even more convoluted. Gregory, McDaniel, and Field (2001)
suggest that the process of resolving disputes and building consensus among parties “can
[also] pose impediments to the creation of insights for decision-makers and lead to the
adoption of inferior policy choices” (p415). Hence, problems are “pronounced with
regard to information management and decision making within integrated emergency
management operating environments” (Paton and Jackson, 2002, p115). Decision-making
in high demand situations is, therefore, critical.
Information sharing, during times of a disaster, is essential for the effective
administration of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. “Making
effective use of information underlies the importance of decision-making and the need for
those in leadership roles to be able to adapt their decision style and to utilize different
decision making procedures” (Paton and Fin, 1999, p264). By developing a framework
that relates the components of emergency management—mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery—in time by sequence of implementing actions, government will
be able to better protect people and property while also maintaining essential bureaucratic
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functions (McLoughlin, 1985). Mushkatel and Weschler also affirm that in order to
improve its directional area and administration, emergency management will require an
understanding of both the policy process and the intergovernmental system within which
it operates, noting that the two must be removed from each other in order to effectively
understand the successes and constraints of current emergency management practices
(1985).
Leadership and control in emergency management makes substantial demands on
the personal resources and competence. It is, therefore, of the most importance for
decision-makers to be aware of personal strengths and limitations, have some knowledge
of how they might react in stressful environments, and what they have to do to control or
minimize negative effects (Paton and Fin, 1999). Leaders also should have a clear
understanding of how citizens react to crises. Research has shown that for the most part,
“people as a whole do not panic” in times of crisis and that most individuals affected and
surrounded by an emergency tend to become “more cohesive and unified” (Quarantelli
1986, p4; Drabek and McEntire 2003, p99). However, others issues do arise that leaders
must face including traffic congestion, media inundation, and lack of communication,
supplies, and equipment. Thus, understanding the reaction of the public and how
behavior can help, or in some cases, hinder response, emergency management leaders
and public officials. And, Paton and Fin have also found that because public officials are
concerned with other, ‘more pertinent’ matters, “little consideration has been given to
understanding the specific stressors likely to affect [people] or their implications for their
thinking and management skills when responding to a disaster” (1999, p. 261). Gregory,
McDaniel, and Fields (2001) also suggest that the process of resolving disputes and
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building consensus among parties “can [also] pose impediments to the creation of
insights for decision-makers and lead to the adoption of inferior policy choices” (p415).
Hence, problems are “pronounced with regard to information management and decision
making within integrated emergency management operating environments” (Paton and
Jackson, 2002, p115).
Disaster Meaning
The impact of disasters is increasingly felt in the artificial world – that is, in the
densely interconnected web of social as well as political environments that comprise
human society (Birkland, 1997; Dynes and Tierney, 1994). “Disaster causality is only
possible by understanding the ways in which social [and political] systems themselves
generate unequal exposure to risk by making some groups of people, individuals, and
some societies more prone to hazards than others” (Cannon, 1994, p13). Serving as both
an idea and experience, modern day disasters are a result of a constructed reality
associated with a given time and specific place (Simon, 1969). Disasters are, thus, a result
of interaction between a historical-cultural system, in which the resultant damage and
loss suffered and the degree of disruption of the system is a product of this interaction
(Bates, 1987). As Farmer sums up, “physical reality, as it is in itself, is beyond [sic]
seeing,” but, rather, what is seen are those phenomena which are apprehended (1995,
p18).
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Place is an integral part of human identity. Many life factors allude to a sense of
place concept, an occurrence in which people strongly identify with a particular
geographical setting—where ‘the linkages between space and representation’ occur are
key indicators of peoples’ identities” (Neaves et al., 2008, p14; de Blij and Alexander,
2000; Weeks, 2002; Stoneall, 1983). There is an inherent interest among people in
shaping, pursuing, and revising individual life-plans that are often defined or constituted
by various attachments or traditions (Tönnies, 1998; Blunt, 2005; Wilson, 1993). “Who
people are is reflected in the places they occupy and control” (Fitzpatrick and LaGory,
2000, p4). Understanding the interactions between people and their surroundings and the
causes and consequences that their activities can in part be achieved by examining the
effects of human life and their activities on the environment in which they occur (Etzioni,
1996; Etzioni, 2000; Durkheim, 1984). Thus, the basic methods of answering questions
concerning locational features, often fail, however, to detail the inter-relationships
between one feature and another (Campbell, 2001; de Blij, 2000; Geertz, 1973). It has,
therefore, become increasingly important for researchers to not only answer questions of
where, but also to attempt to answer questions of why there. Thus, to maintain the
structural functionalism of a society, individuals within it must be mindful of the cultural
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climate surrounding the community, and how key societal issues interplay with and affect
one another.
Scientific Approach
Society is an organized association of individuals characterized by patterns and
interactions of relationships that share a distinctive ideology - an environment of the
same attitudes, beliefs, and practices, that affect communal identity, degree of
cohesiveness, and local heritage (Etzioni, 1996; Gilligan, 1987; Gettis, Gettis, and
Quastler, 2001). As an entity exhibiting an intimate life-style of shared experiences, a
“community is not merely a social entity whose members are bound by a web of
crisscrossing affective bonds, but also one in which members share a set of core
[political] values,” in which “values are handed down from generation to generation, via
socialization, and in this sense are traditional” (Etzioni, 2000, p191). For members of a
community to integrate new values into their culture, these values must undergo a process
referred to as a moral dialogue. Moral dialogue is the application where “people engage
in deliberations that involve not merely facts, logic, reasoning, and rational exchanges,
but also intensive discussions in which their normative commitments are engaged”
(Etzioni, 2000, p192).
Social and political reality is a “constellation of thoughts, perceptions, and
feelings.” Communal action, therefore, “takes place within the context of
intersubjectively shared norms” (White, 1999, p127). People establish a set of
overarching principles to ascribe to; yet, consensus is hard to obtain as many people vary
greatly in their opinions on public issues (Balfour and Mesaros, 1994). “The reasons are
simple: new issues have appeared and the meaning of old issues has changed” (Nie,
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Verba, and Petrocik 1979, p96). For a society to progressively evolve, its language “must
reflect the change in values rather than significantly diverge from them” (Etzioni 2000,
p88).
“When values are less and less heeded, it is often argued that the society requires
more laws, more regulations, stronger sanctions, more law enforcement resources and
powers, and more severe punishments for those who violate the laws. A good society is
thus by definition one governed not merely by contracts, voluntary arrangements, and
laws freely enacted, but also by a thick layer of mores that are in turn derived from
values” (Etzioni, 2000, p192).
Social capital and political trust have been identified as “key to the effective
functioning of democratic polities” (Sturgis et al., 2010, p210). Democratic rule, as based
on the idea that the sovereign power is a government of, by and for the people, requires a
certain level of obligation from its citizenry. There is an expectation of citizen
involvement and sacrifice. A democratic citizen must be willing to defer to the good of
the larger community, even when that means helping to fund programs from which they
will receive no personal benefit. A great deal has been written and theorized about the
duties of democratic citizens and the strains of commitment required (Rawls, 1971;
Dworkin, 2003; Walzer, 1990; Sandel, 1984; Goodin, 1985). While many aspects of this
are still debated, a common agreement is that such levels of obligation are undermined by
feelings of alienation, lack of political efficacy, and/or distrust in government institutions
and officials. The general idea is that social capital and political trust and a belief in
reciprocity are the building blocks for communal development which then leads
individuals to become engaged in political activities, resulting in a commitment to the
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state as well as general democratic processes and institutions (Zmerli and Newton, 2008;
Rothstein and Uslaner, 2006).
Social capital and political trust, more broadly conceived, are important because
they affect the willingness of individuals to support the government as well as public
policies; especially those that demand some form of sacrifice (Putnam, 2000). This
requires a belief in the fairness of the game as well as a belief that the group has common
interests and a shared future. If individuals do not feel that the government shares their
concerns or that institutions are rigged against them, their loyalty, trust and social
cooperation are in danger of being eroded. This can happen on various levels of
government – federal, state, and local – and can involve both formal and informal
institutions. Furthermore, there are specific events that cause added strain and potentially
fracture this cohesion and reliance, which make certain time periods for examining levels
of social capital and political trust especially relevant (Zmerli and Newton, 2008;
Blendon, et al., 1997; Hetherington, 2005).
Conceptual Application
Disasters are socially and politically constructed phenomena (Rozario, 2007;
Hoffman and Oliver-Smith, 2002; Mileti, 1999). “Disasters are human-induced [sic]
events that are part of the social [and political] processes that characterize societies
throughout the world” (Rodriguez and Barnshaw, 2006, p35). Weichselgartner (2001)
provides that hazards to disasters vary by place, and, as such, occur within the social and
political realms of reality. Given the impact of social capital and political trust on
democratic citizens and good governance, it is essential to know what influences public
perception during times of disasters, especially technological disasters (Sylves, 2008;
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Trim, 2004). Technological disasters are incidents that result from the failure of
technology, malfunctions in engineering, or flaws in structural designs. Oil spills, in
particular, are just an assumed a fact of life (Sylves and Comfort, 2012). Sylves (1998)
observes, “How damaging an oil spill is depends in part on the degree of emergency
preparedness in place before the event, the speed of response, and the effectiveness of
recovery operations once a spill has occurred” (p13).
Prior research, in this regard, has demonstrated that the consequences of disasters,
especially technological disasters, are often broad-based, long-term, and unanticipated
(Gill and Picou, 1991). Specifically:
1. Political trust is especially vulnerable in technological disasters—there is
someone or something to blame;
2. Social capital can be easily weakened—the loss of trust in institutions and
social divisions resulting from differences in environmental impact
experiences and long-term solutions;
3. Remediation strategies can have unanticipated negative consequences—
there may be community splits and animosity resulting from those who are
subsidized to help in the clean-up efforts and those that are not; and
4. Litigation has substantial impacts upon individuals and communities
throughout the entire legal cycle—there may be significant impacts upon
livelihoods, industries, recreation, and tourism (Picou and Gill, 1997;
Picou, Gill, and Cohen, 2008).
Risks to hazards are evaluated contextually, and the perception of risk motivates
disaster behavior (Drabek, 2006). It is, thus, believed that attitudes toward government
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responsibility and perceptions of the speed, efficiency, and magnitude of the
government’s response to disasters, negatively influence the social capital and political
trust among impacted individuals.
Relevant Case Study
There are several case studies as related to emergency management but only one
that examines social capital and political trust as it relates to disaster policy, directly
pointing to the need of community engagement in emergency management activities. In
Murphy’s “Locating Social Capital in Resilient Community-Level Emergency
Management,” the author conducted a case study of municipal government
responsibilities and community-level initiatives as related to emergency management in
the aftermath of two distinct disasters, the 2003 Northeast electricity outage and the 2000
Walkerton water-borne disease outbreak (2007). The author found that in smaller, closeknit communities, there existed a higher degree of social capital in the form of a
cohesiveness not experienced in larger areas where its members are more fluid. As such,
the community is more likely to become engaged with local emergency management
activities because they hold more of a vested political interest in seeing the resiliency of
the area, their livelihoods. The author utilized household surveys for the larger population
area associated with the electricity outage and focus groups for the smaller population
group associated with the water-borne disease. However, this study was limited in that
there was no pre/post establishment of “assessing and ameliorating resiliency prior to a
crisis” (Murphy, 2007, p312). Still, this is likely with most case studies examining a
specific event, such as a disaster, coupled with the fact that it is hard to establish
baselines when disasters are fairly unpredictable. All in all, the author did a fairly well
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job in “assess[ing] emergency preparedness levels in the wake of [both events] and
[evaluating] the impact and community response (Murphy, 2007).
Existing Legislation
Out of the federal government’s efforts to correct environmental problems came
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). NEPA is a federal environmental law encouraging the “productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment” (EPA #1, 2010). By dividing the
landmark environmental policy into two separate, distinguishable procedural parts,
policy-makers sought to generate awareness around environmental problems while
emphasizing action forcing provisions among federal entities as well as any of their
associated or funded programs to comply with such proactive or corrective policies. The
EPA is the federal agency tasked with protecting human and environmental health by
writing regulations and enforcing statutes enacted by Congress.
Often times, “environmental regulations depend on the will and ability of the
regulated to comply” (Winter and May, 2001, p 676). Therefore, motivation is derived
from normative and the social determinations—the initiation, direction, and intensity of a
particular behavior. As an innate part of human nature, it is the underlying willingness
moving individuals and/or groups to achieve a sense of moral duty and agreement. And,
by providing the impulse to contribute a larger benefit, firms are motivated to earn the
respect and approval of other firms and people they associate with (Firestone, 2001).
Nowadays, however, the EPA is moving in a different direction—an emphasis on the
prevention of environmental problems before they occur. Not only does the EPA set
national standards to protect the natural environment against common contaminants, it
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also takes broader measures to promote clean air and water, land preservation and
restoration, healthy communities and ecosystems, and environmental stewardship
(Chiras, 2000).
In continuing this line of regulation concerning manmade disasters, particularly
technological disasters, the federal government passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA) in
1990 (EPA #2, 2010). This legislation was an immediate response to the Exxon Valdez
oil spill that occurred on March 23, 1989, in the Prince William Sound off the coast of
Cordova, Alaska, which released up to 750 million barrels of oil across approximately
11,000 square miles. The legislation was introduced in the U.S. House by Representative
Walter B. Jones, Sr. of North Carolina along with 79 co-sponsors. Since the U.S. had
never seen an technological disaster in the form of an oil spill to this magnitude, really,
nor even the world, advocates found precedence to proceed forward based upon the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), which provided Congress
the sole authority to regulate navigable waters. The legislation enjoyed widespread bipartisan and bi-cameral support, passing both the House and the Senate unanimously
after going to conference.
Upon its passage, the OPA provided for primarily two things. First, the legislation
to an emergency management approach to mitigating and preventing civil liability for
future oil spills off the U.S. coast in the future, emphatically stated that companies must
have a “plan to prevent [oil] spills that may occur” and have a “detailed containment and
cleanup plan” for oil spills (EPA #2, 2010) Second, the legislation also provided for a
clause that prohibited any oil carrying vessel that had spilled more than 1 million gallons
in a marine area from further operating in Prince William Sound. As of the early 2000s,
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the act had prevented nearly 20 ships from operating in the area. The legislation also set
up the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, “which is available to provide up to one billion
dollars per spill incident” (EPA #2, 2010). And, in addition to these efforts, “the OPA
provided new requirements for contingency planning both by government and industry...
[by setting up the] National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
(NCP)” (EPA #2, 2010).
The NCP is a “three-tiered approach: the federal government is required to direct
all public and private response efforts for certain types of spill events; Area Committees - composed of federal, state, and local government officials -- must develop detailed,
location-specific Area Contingency Plans; and owners or operators of vessels and certain
facilities that pose a serious threat to the environment must prepare their own Facility
Response Plans” (EPA #2, 2010). The OPA also “increased penalties for regulatory
noncompliance, broadened the response and enforcement authorities of the Federal
government, and preserved State authority to establish law governing oil spill prevention
and response” (EPA #2, 2010).
There are still a number of policy questions surrounding the DwH oil spill and
implications it might have for the OPA. In its immediate aftermath, it was anticipated that
there would be a shift in disaster policy as dictated by punctuating equilibrium theory.
Punctuated equilibrium theory contents that policymaking occurs in a between
alternative phases of relatively stable periods, or stasis, and dramatic transformative
episodes, or punctuations (True, Jones, and Baumgartner, 1999; Givel, 2010). Whereas
stasis occurs when policy areas are dominated by policy subsystems, punctuation
occurs when policy subsystems breakdown and are pushed into the macro-political
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environment (Jones and Baumgartner, 2005). Some policy issues, therefore, already
exist but wait for an opportune time to arise and make headway among both the public
and government officials. This greater issue attention is often centered on a focusing
event, which opens a typically closed off policy window, such as in the case of a disaster.
Much like the response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, there have been numerous attempts
to reform the OPA by raising its $75 million cap limit on lost damages to $10 billion, and
even retroactively to before the spill occurred; however, little progress has been made
except in regards to operating procedures and safety standards.
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CHAPTER IV
MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY

Research focused on disaster planning and response is fundamentally based on
how people perceive risk-related information. This process is strongly shaped by cultural
and demographic factors (Groves, 1990). Taken collectively, such measures can be
derived as probabilistic risk assessments by conducting a series of systematically
structured interviews that monitor the attitudes, beliefs, and practices across a populationbased spectrum of needs as related to institutions that compose the everyday fabric of
society in the form of case studies. Case studies are a distinctive form of empirical
inquiry that can be either descriptive, what is going on, or explanatory, why it is going
on, in nature or a combination of the two (Lenson and Rodgers, 2001; Yin, 2009).
Essentially, it is the cumulative knowledge or holistic examination of developmental
factors of an individual unit of analysis in an attempt to build or expand an existing
theoretical framework (Gerring, 2004; Cresswell, 2007; de Vaus, 2001; Stake, 1985).
Variables
An underlining assumption driving this study was the understanding that at least
three domains of policy preferences exist that characterized the social and political
climate for disaster responsibility in the US, including quality of life, community
involvement, and trust in government. This study is designed to provide statistical
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estimates about how social capital and political trust impact disaster responsibility with
considerations for the demographic background. The following topics were explored: 1)
how does race impact education, income, and ideology, 2) how does education and
income impact ideology, 3) how does education and income impact quality of life and
trust in government, 4) how does ideology impact quality of life, community
involvement, and trust in government, 5) how does quality of life impact disaster impact
and disaster responsibility, 6) how does community involvement impact disaster impact
and disaster responsibility, and 7) how does trust in government impact disaster impact
and disaster responsibility. As such, the individual is the unit of analysis for this research
and the variables are as follows. The dependent variable is disaster responsibility with
independent variables of quality of life, community involvement, and trust in
government, along with an intervening variable of disaster impact and control variables
of race, education, income, and ideology.

Figure 1

Model
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Hypotheses
The hypotheses driving this research are broken into control hypotheses and
independent hypotheses. The variables represented in the control hypotheses include the
control variables of race, education, income, and ideology. The variables represented in
the independent hypotheses include the independent variables of quality of life,
community involvement, and trust in government as well as the intervening variable of
disaster impact and the independent variable of disaster responsibility.
Control Hypotheses
Race
1. Individuals who are white are more likely to have higher levels of
education and higher levels of income, as compared to individuals who are
black.
2. Individuals who are white more likely to have a conservative ideology, as
compared to individuals who are black.
Education and Income
1. Individuals with higher levels of education and higher levels of income are
more likely to have a conservative ideology, as compared to individuals
with lower levels of education and lower levels of income.
2. Individuals with higher levels of education and higher levels of income are
more likely to have a higher quality of life, as compared to individuals
with lower levels of education and lower levels of income.
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3. Individuals with higher levels of education and higher levels of income are
less likely to trust the government, as compared to individuals with lower
levels of education and lower levels of income.
Ideology
1. Individuals who have a conservative ideology are more likely to have a
higher quality of life, as compared to individuals who have a liberal
ideology.
2. Individuals who have a conservative ideology are more likely to be
actively involved in their community, as compared to individuals who
have a liberal ideology.
3. Individuals who have a conservative ideology are less likely to trust the
government, as compared to individuals who have a liberal ideology.
Independent Hypotheses
Quality of Life
1. Individuals with a higher quality of life are more likely to indicate that the
oil spill had no or a low impact on them as compared to individuals with a
lower quality of life.
2. Individuals with a higher quality of life are more likely to indicate that the
victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility as
compared to individuals with a lower quality of life.
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Community Involvement
1. Individuals who are actively involved in their community are more likely
to indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact on them as compared to
individuals who are not actively involved in their community.
2. Individuals who are actively involved in their community are more likely
to indicate that the victims themselves should assume the majority of
responsibility as compared to individuals who are not actively involved in
their community.
Trust in Government
1. Individuals who are less likely to trust the government are more likely to
indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact on them as compared to
individuals who are more likely to trust in government.
2. Individuals who are less likely to trust the government are more likely to
indicate that the victims themselves should assume the majority of
responsibility as compared to individuals who are more likely to trust in
government.
Disaster Impact
1. Individuals who indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact on them
are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves should assume the
majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who indicate the oil
spill had a high impact on them.
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Questionnaire Development
Information was drawn from Enhancing the Coastal IQ Survey, to test the model
and hypotheses. Enhancing the Coastal IQ Survey was developed, under the auspices of
the The Social Climate of Disaster Preparedness, as a public opinion survey to
investigate the social and political attitudes, policy beliefs, and behavioral practices of
coastal residents in regards to disasters. The instrument underlying this study incorporates
a number of questions and scales that are being applied for the first time in examining the
disconnect between social capital and political trust as specifically related to disaster
responsibility. See Appendix 1. Survey Questionnaire. However, it would be remiss to
not recognize prior scientific polls that were utilized as guides in the conceptual
development of this particular questionnaire, including those conducted by The Gallup
Organization, Polling Report, USA Today, Newsweek Poll, and Pew Research Center.
Survey Protocol
Upon receiving approval from the Institutional Review Board for the Protection
of Human Subjects at MSU, per Docket #10-150, Enhancing the Coastal IQ Survey was
administered by telephone to a representative sample of adults residing in coastal
counties/parishes among the states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Texas. See Appendix 2. The approximately 144 counties/parishes were then subdivided
into seven population-based clusters that also align with distinctive geographic culturalbased areas. See Figure 2. and Table 1.
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Figure 2

Survey Population Clusters
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Table 1

Survey Geographic Cultural Areas

Region 1 – Florida Central and Low Land Counties
Bay, Calhoun, Dixie, Escambia, Franklin, Gadsden, Gulf, Holmes, Jackson, Jefferson,
Lafayette, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Suwannee, Taylor, Wakulla,
Walton, and Washington
Region 2 – Florida Panhandle Counties
Charlotte, Citrus, Collier, DeSoto, Gilchrist, Glades, Hardee, Hendry, Hernando,
Hillsborough, Lake, Lee, Levy, Manatee, Marion, Monroe, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk,
Sarasota, and Sumter
Region 3 – Alabama Coastal Plain Counties
Baldwin, Clarke, Covington, Escambia, Geneva, Mobile, Monroe, and Washington
Region 4 – Mississippi Coastal Plain Counties
Amite, George, Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Lamar, Marion, Pearl River, Pike, Stone,
Walthall, and Wilkinson
Region 5 – Louisiana Central, Acadiana, Greater New Orleans, and Florida Proper
Parishes
Acadia, Allen, Ascension, Assumption, Avoyelles, Beauregard, Calcasieu, Cameron,
East Baton Rouge, East Feliciana, Evangeline, Iberia, Iberville, Jefferson, Jefferson
Davis, Lafayette, Lafourche, Livingston, Orleans, Plaquemines, Pointe Coupee,
Rapides, Sabine, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. Helena, St. James, St. John the Baptist,
St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, Vermilion,
Vernon, Washington, West Baton Rouge, and West Feliciana
Region 6 – Texas Coastal Plain Counties
Aransas, Bee, Brooks, Calhoun, Cameron, Colorado, DeWitt, Duval, Fayette, Goliad,
Hardin, Hildalgo, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jim Hogg, Jim Wells, Kenedy, Kleberg,
Lavaca, Live Oak, Newton, Orange, Refugio, Starr, Tyler, Victoria, Washington,
Webb, Wharton, and Willacy
Region 7 – Texas Coastal and South Plain Counties
Austin, Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, Liberty, Matagorda,
Montgomery, Nueces, San Patricio, and Waller

For each of the identified survey population regions, a dual-frame sample was
employed, whereby approximately 60 percent of the respondents were contacted via
landline phone and 40 percent via cellular phone. Individuals in these areas were
interviewed between the second week of November 2011 and the first week of April
2012. Once a household was contacted, informed consent was obtained by asking to
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speak with a person 18 years of age or older and randomly who had either the last or next
birthday. Attempts to contact households were made eight times before being retired and
replaced. Each of the respondents were then told that should they participate, all of their
responses would be kept confidential, after which any identifying information would be
stripped away from the dataset as quickly as possible in order to maintain complete
anonymity. A Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing System was used to collect the
data.
Sample Population
The respondent sample in Enhancing the Coastal IQ Survey represents the
civilian, non-institutionalized adult population over the age of 18 in the targeted survey
area. Households were selected using an enhanced stratified random digit dialing (RDD)
sampling design that was obtained from Survey Sampling International, Inc., including
those individuals with unlisted numbers. Of the 75,000 RDD-derived numbers dialed for
the survey: 37,333 were determined inappropriate for the sampling frame as a result of
disconnected numbers, business and unintended cellular phones or fax machines,
respondent was under the age of 18 years, and/or respondent resides outside of targeted
area; 25,166 numbers were not reached for an interview because of no answer, busy
signal, and/or answering machine or voicemail after eight attempts; 6,959 refused to
accept the phone call prior to expressing the purpose of the study while 169 refused
during the interview; 270 were callbacks that could not be completed during the time
frame for this study or were interviews that prematurely ended; 1,958 could not
participate because of a communication or language problem and/or health complication;
103 were absent from the home for the duration of this study; and 213 were unused
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numbers. These dispositions codes resulted in 10,227 total eligible numbers, 39,394 total
ineligible numbers, and 25,379 total unknown numbers. See Table 2.
Table 2

Expanded Disposition Codes

Expanded Disposition Codes
Completed survey
Refused during introduction
Refused during interview
Hung up prior to introduction, person hostile
Hung up prior to introduction, person agitated
Hung up prior to introduction, person ambivalent
Hung up prior to introduction, person friendly
Immediate hang-up
Requested callback, no start
Requested callback, during screening
Requested callback, during interview
No answer
Busy signal
Answering machine / voicemail
Communication or language problem
Unable to participate due to a health problem
Out of town for duration of study
Not in correct county or parish
Under 18 years of age
Not a home phone
Disconnected number / fax tone
Unused number

Number
Retired
Retired
Retired
Retired
Retired
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Returned to queue
Retired
Retired
Retired
Retired
Retired
Retired
Retired
Never entered queue

Total
2,829
991
169
332
2,820
695
1,080
1,041
181
33
56
9,328
729
15,109
1,576
382
103
578
148
2,030
34,577
213

Cooperation and Response Rates
The cooperation and response rates serve as indicators for survey quality as a
measure of demographic representativeness. Rates are calculated based on collapsed
disposition codes to classify numbers. See Table 3.
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Table 3

Collapsed Disposition Codes

Disposition
Completed
Refusals
Hang Ups
Bad Numbers
Unknown
Incomplete Callbacks
Communication or Health Problem

Total
2,829
1,160
5,968
37,436
25,379
270
1,958

Cooperation rates are based on the number of completed surveys and the number
of survey refusals. Of the eligible respondents successfully contacted for ECIQS, 2,829
respondents completed the survey, while 1,160 people refused to participate, for a
cooperation rate of 70.9 percent.
Cooperation rate formula = completed/(completed+refusals)

(1)

Calculation  2,829/(2,829+1,160) = 70.9 percent

(2)

Response rates are based on the number of completed surveys and the amount of
eligible numbers. Whereas ineligible numbers include the amount of bad numbers plus
numbers associated with communication or health problems, eligible numbers include the
amount of number for completed surveys plus the numbers for refusals, hang ups, and
incomplete callbacks. Again, of the eligible respondents successfully contacted for
ECIQS, 2,829 respondents completed the survey among 10,227 eligible numbers, for an
overall response rate of 27.7 percent.
Response rate formula = completed/(eligible numbers)

(3)

Calculation  2,829/(10,227) = 27.7 percent

(4)
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Data Weighting, Validity, and Reliability
Sampling techniques employing random-digit dialing can often result in biased
estimates since telephone coverage is a non-random event. That is, telephone responses
may vary by demographic factors resulting in key differences between the study
population parameter and its estimate that it is actually non-random. Often times, this
sample bias often leads to an under-sampling of men, blacks, the elderly, and the young.
To address this possible bias and achieve a representative sample of adults in Enhancing
the Coastal IQ Survey, the survey data were weighted according to the US Census
Bureau’s American Community Survey five-year estimates for 2005-2009 figures, the
most readily available at the time, to adjust for deviations in race, gender, and age to
obtain a representative sample. This resulted in a new number of completed surveys from
the original N Size of 2,829 to the weighted N Size of 2,558. See Table 4 and Appendix
C.
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Table 4

Survey Population Characteristics

Characteristics
State
Alabama
Florida
Louisiana
Mississippi
Texas
Race
White
Black
Other
Gender
Male
Female
Age
18-24 Years
25-44 Years
45-64 Years
65+ Years
Education
Less than High School
High School Graduate
Some College
College Graduate and Above

Original
N Size

Original
Percent

Weighted
N
Size

Weighted
Percent

403
813
403
403
807

14.2
28.7
14.2
14.2
28.5

285
645
323
277
1,028

11.1
25.2
12.6
10.8
40.2

2,075
481
188

75.6
17.5
6.9

1,322
276
875

53.5
11.1
35.4

1,162
1,664

41.1
58.8

1,205
1,350

47.2
52.8

195
565
1076
837

7.3
21.1
40.3
31.3

334
781
879
408

13.9
32.5
36.6
17.0

302
874
615
996

10.8
31.4
22.1
35.7

325
770
570
850

12.9
30.6
22.7
33.8

It is also important to note response rates for telephone surveying techniques are
on a downward trend in general, as many individuals, particularly the young, now only
have cellular phones rather than landline phones. Though this survey tried to combat this
issue by incorporating a 60/40 percent mix of landline phones and cellular phones, the
disposition codes that are used to calculate the response, refusal, and cooperation rates
were collapsed altogether to provide a single set of rates, rather than separate rates.
Therefore, if each of the set of rates had been separated, it may have likely increased both
the response and cooperation rates, decreasing the refusal rate.
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Further, the sampling error for the total data set, for dichotomous response options
with a 50/50 split, is no larger than ± 2 percent, a 95 percent confidence level. Further,
system missing codes within the dataset indicate that a question was not asked of a given
respondent because it did not apply. Additionally, since the data underlying this study
was collected as primary data with specific categorical responses, there was no need to
eliminate outliers.
Variable Operationalization
The study relies on one dependent variable, three independent variables, one
intervening variable, and four control variables. In order to condense response categories
and have enough people to analyze, variables were recoded into sets of categorical
information based on items from the survey questionnaire while all others or system
missing codes were not included.
The dependent, nominal variable of disaster responsibility was based on the
survey question “Following a disaster, who should assume the majority of the
responsibility for taking care of victims and their families,” with the response categories
of: 1) victims themselves, 2) privately funded organizations such as the Red Cross,
Salvation Army, churches, etc., 3) government agencies such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 4) non-profit organizations, 5) combination / shared responsibility,
and 6) other with specification. The variable was recoded into: 1) victims themselves, 2)
privately funded organizations, 3) government agencies, and 4) non-profit organizations.
This process was completed for the independent variables of quality of life,
community involvement, and trust in government as well. The ordinal variable of quality
of life was based on the survey question “How would you rate your quality of life,” with
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the response categories of: 1) excellent, 2) good, 3) fair, and 4) poor. The variable was
recoded into: 1) excellent/good, 2) fair, and 3) poor, given that excellent and good are
both positive response, fair is neutral or ambivalent, and poor is negative. The ordinal
variable of community involvement was based on the survey question “How active would
you say you are in your community, such as in local government or volunteer
organizations,” with the response categories of: 1) very active, 2) somewhat active, 3)
neither active nor inactive, 4) somewhat inactive, and 5) very inactive. The variable was
recoded into: 1) active, 2) neither active nor inactive, and 3) inactive. The ordinal
variable of trust in government was based on the survey question “In general, how often
do you trust the government to do what is right,” with the response categories of: 1)
almost always, 2) most of the time, 3) some of the time, 4) rarely, and 5) never. The
variable was recoded into: 1) always/most of the time, 2) sometimes, and 3) rarely/never,
given that almost always and most of the time are both positive responses, some of the
time is neutral or ambivalent, and rarely or never are negative.
The intervening variable of disaster impact was based in the survey question “On
a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being no impact and 5 being the highest impact, how much of an
impact do you think the oil spill had on you,” with the response category as the exact
number. Since the scale began with one for no impact, the variable was recoded into: 1)
one to three having a no or a low impact, 2) four having a medium impact, and 3) five
having a high impact.
Finally, this process was also conducted for the control variables of race,
education, income, and ideology. The nominal variable of race was based on the survey
question ““What is your race,” with the response categories of: 1) white or Caucasian, 2)
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black, 3) American Indian or Native Alaskan, 3) Asian, 4) Native Hawaiian or other
Pacific Islander, 5) Respondent indicates multi-racial, and 6) indicates some other race.
The variable was recoded into: 1) white, 2) black, and 3) other. The ordinal variable of
education was based on the survey question “What was the last grade in school you
completed,” with the response categories of: 1) grades 11th or less , 2) completed high
school or 12th grade equivalent, 3) some college, 4) completed college , and 5) some
graduate work. The variable was recoded into: 1) less than high school, 2) high school
graduate, 3) some college, and 4) college graduate and beyond. The interval variable of
income was based on the survey question “I am going to read some income categories,
stop me when I get to the one that best describes your total 2010 household income from
all sources before taxes,” with the response categories of: 1) below $20,000, 2) $20,000
to $50,000, 3) $50,000 to $75,000, 4) $75,000 to $100,000, 5) $100,000 to $125,000, 6)
$125,000 to $150,000, 7) $150,000 to $175,000, 8) $175,000 to $200,000, and 9)
$200,000 and above. The variable was recoded into: 1) below $20,000, 2) $20,000 to
$50,000, and 3) above $50,000. The ordinal variable of ideology was based on the survey
question “What do you consider to be your political ideology,” with the response
categories of: 1) very liberal, 2) somewhat liberal, 3) moderate, 4) somewhat
conservative, and 5) very conservative. The variable was recoded into: 1) liberal, 2)
moderate, and 3) conservative.
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CHAPTER V
RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics
Population research is exploratory in nature. In order to quantitatively summarize
features of the sample as a collection of information, descriptive statistics were ran to
measure central tendency and dispersion among all variables. For central tendency, the
mode, median, and mean were calculated to respectively determine the category with the
greatest number of cases, the category with the middle case, and the average score of all
cases. For dispersion, the range, standard deviation, and variance were calculated to
determine the distance or how divided or united the case scores were.
For the dependent variable disaster responsibility, the mode is government
agencies. For the independent variable quality of life, the mode is excellent/good. For the
independent variable community involvement, the mode is active. For the independent
variable trust in government, the mode is some of the time. For the control variable race,
the mode is white. For the control variable education, the mode is college graduate and
above. For the control variable income, the mode is $20,000 to $50,000. For the control
variable ideology, the mode is very or somewhat conservative. For the intervening
variable disaster impact, the mode is no or a low impact. See Table 5.
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Table 5

Variable Descriptive Statistics

Variable
Dependent
Disaster Responsibility
Independent
Quality of Life
Community Involvement
Trust in Government
Intervening
Disaster Impact
Control
Race
Education
Income
Ideology

N
Size

Standard
Mode Median Mean Range Variance Deviation

1,736

3.00 3.0000 2.2746 3.00

.917

.95736

2,536
2,545
2,481

1.00 1.0000 1.2310 2.00
1.00 1.0000 1.9042 2.00
2.00 2.0000 2.0286 2.00

.238
.922
.607

.48775
.95999
.77878

2,458

1.00 1.0000 1.3576 2.00

.466

.68273

2,473
2,515
1,866
2,261

1.00
4.00
3.00
3.00

.856
1.110
.722
.643

.92533
1.05347
.85000
.80158

1.0000
3.0000
2.0000
3.0000

1.8192
2.7735
2.1774
2.2915

2.00
3.00
2.00
2.00

Frequency Distributions
In order to organize the interpretation of data, survey items are often gauged on
the degree of societal attachment or cultural support among respondents. As such, the
higher the percentage endorsement of a social climate item, the more likely that item will
become part of the social fabric of the population segment surveyed. Items are
universally accepted when they are fully supported and accepted (85-100 percent of
respondents); predominantly accepted when they are mostly supported but there is still a
small number of people who reject them (65-84 percent of respondents); contested when
the public is divided and opinions and beliefs are very different (35-64 percent of
respondents); and marginal when they are supported by only a small share of people (034 percent of respondents). Frequency distributions were, therefore, examined among the
set of dependent, independent, and intervening variables, according to the schemata. See
Table 6.
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Table 6

Heuristic Frequency Distributions

Quality of Life
Predominant
 Rate their quality of life as excellent or good (79.9 percent)
65-84 Percent
Community Involvement
Contested
 Are very or somewhat active in their community, such as in local
35-64 Percent
government or volunteer organizations (51.3 percent)
Trust in Government
Marginal
 Rarely or never trust government, in general, to do what is right
0-34 Percent
(31.8 percent)
Disaster Impact
Predominant
 Indicated that the oil spill had no or a low impact (levels 1-3) on
65-84 Percent
them (76.1 percent)
Disaster Responsibility
 Find that following a disaster, the victims themselves should
Marginal
assume the majority of the responsibility for taking care of
0-34 Percent
victims and their families (30.1 percent)

Of all the respondents surveyed, 79.9 percent rated their quality of life as
excellent or good. Among those who rated their quality of life as excellent or good, this
was statistically significant at the <.05 level for whites (56.8 percent), college graduates
and above (38.8 percent), and those who earn above $50,000 per year (52.6 percent). See
Table 7.
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Table 7

Variable Summary Statistic for Quality of Life

“How would you rate your quality of life? Would you say:”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-2536)
Excellent/
N
Chi /
Characteristic
Good
Fair
Poor
Size
Gamma
Total
79.9
17.1
3.0
Race
White
1316
56.8
40.1
47.8
.000 /
Black
273
10.0
15.2
18.8
.229
Other
862
33.2
44.7
33.3
Education
Less than High School
319
10.0
21.7
35.6
High School Graduate
764
27.8
42.4
37.0
.000 /
Some College
569
23.3
21.1
17.8
-.451
College Graduate and Above 843
38.8
14.7
9.6
Income
Below $20,000
533
23.1
44.6
85.2
.000 /
$20,000 to $50,000
459
24.3
29.5
7.4
-.513
Above $50,000
862
52.6
25.9
7.4
Ideology
Liberal
468
21.4
22.4
24.2
.826 /
Moderate
615
27.1
29.2
27.4
-.047
Conservative
1141
51.5
48.4
48.4
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question
In terms of how community involvement of all the respondents surveyed, 51.3
percent indicated that they were active in their community. Among those who are active
in their community, this was statistically significant at the <.05 level for whites (51.7
percent), college graduates and above (39.8 percent), those who earn above $50,000 per
year (51.5 percent), and conservatives (54.2 percent). See Table 8.
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Table 8

Variable Summary Statistic for Community Involvement

“How active would you say you are in your community, such as in local government or
volunteer organizations? Are you:”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-2545)
Neither
Active
N
Chi /
nor
Size
Gamma
Characteristic
Active
Inactive Inactive
Total
51.3
7.0
41.7
Race
White
1311
51.7
65.1
53.2
.001 /
Black
275
12.0
13.6
9.7
-.015
Other
875
36.2
21.3
37.1
Education
Less than High School
324
9.3
11.4
17.7
High School Graduate
765
27.7
36.0
33.1
.000 /
Some College
569
23.2
23.4
22.0
-.221
College Graduate and Above 846
39.8
29.1
27.2
Income
Below $20,000
534
23.6
35.4
34.4
.000 /
$20,000 to $50,000
459
25.0
24.6
24.3
-.181
Above $50,000
867
51.5
40.0
41.3
Ideology
Liberal
492
20.2
16.6
24.9
.002 /
Moderate
614
25.5
31.9
28.7
-.117
Conservative
1149
54.2
51.5
46.4
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
As far as trust in government for all respondents surveyed, 31.8 percent rarely
trust the government. Among those who rarely trust the government, this was statistically
significant at the <.05 level for whites (63.9 percent) and conservatives (60.3 percent),
and education and income also played a roled. See Table 9.
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Table 9

Variable Summary Statistic for Trust in Government

“In general, how often do you trust the government to do what is right? Would you say:”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-2481)
Most of SomeN
Chi /
Characteristic
the Time times
Rarely
Size
Gamma
Total
28.9
39.3
31.8
Race
White
1279
42.5
52.5
63.9
.000 /
Black
268
15.8
11.0
7.1
-.216
Other
858
41.8
36.5
29.0
Education
Less than High School
313
11.5
12.1
14.8
High School Graduate
748
31.5
28.5
32.4
.017 /
Some College
555
20.3
24.0
23.2
-.071
College Graduate and Above 829
36.7
35.3
29.5
Income
Below $20,000
520
28.5
26.0
31.5
.001 /
$20,000 to $50,000
453
19.6
28.7
24.7
-.074
Above $50,000
854
51.9
45.3
43.8
Ideology
Liberal
481
23.0
24.1
17.4
.000 /
Moderate
611
32.3
28.1
22.4
.154
Conservative
1125
44.7
47.8
60.3
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
Of all the respondents surveyed and regarding disaster impacts, 76.1 percent
indicated that the disaster had no or low impact upon them. Among those who indicated
that the disaster had a no or a low impact upon them, this was statistically significant at
the <.05 level for whites (57.4 percent), college graduates and above (35.9 percent), those
who earn above $50,000 per year (48.7 percent), and conservatives (48.6 percent). See
Table 10.
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Table 10

Variable Summary Statistic for Disaster Impact

“On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being no impact and 5 being the highest impact, how much
of an impact do you think the oil spill had on you?”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-2458)
No or
N
Chi /
Characteristic
Low
Medium High
Size
Gamma
Total
76.1
12.1
11.8
Race
White
1282
57.4
42.1
41.5
.000 /
Black
268
10.7
10.0
16.0
.249
Other
838
31.9
47.9
42.6
Education
Less than High School
305
11.9
9.1
20.5
High School Graduate
729
30.2
30.3
28.1
.000 /
Some College
561
22.0
29.0
23.6
-.085
College Graduate and Above 837
35.9
31.6
27.8
Income
Below $20,000
511
25.5
30.7
39.9
.000 /
$20,000 to $50,000
456
25.8
20.2
24.5
-.157
Above $50,000
860
48.7
49.1
35.6
Ideology
Liberal
483
22.4
23.4
16.9
.000 /
Moderate
603
29.0
25.2
18.5
.140
Conservative
1122
48.6
51.5
64.6
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
Finally, for disaster responsibility of all the respondents surveyed, 30.1 percent
indicated that victims themselves should assume a majority of the responsibility for
taking care of victims and their families following a disaster. Among those who indicated
that victims themselves should assume a majority of the responsibility for taking care of
victims and their families following a disaster, this was statistically significant at the <.05
level for whites (72.9 percent), college graduates and above (40.5 percent), those who
earn above $50,000 per year (58.9 percent), and conservatives (60.1 percent). See Table
11.
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Table 11

Variable Summary Statistic for Disaster Responsibility

“Following a disaster, who should assume the majority of the responsibility for taking
care of victims and their families?”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-1736)
Privat
Victe
Govern Nonims
Organ- -ment
profit
N
Chi /
AgenOrgan- Gamma
Size Them- izaCharacteristic
selves tions
cies
izations
Total
30.1
18.1
46.1
5.7
Race
White
870
72.9
52.8
39.8
39.1
.000 /
Black
198
6.4
13.4
15.4
6.5
.392
Other
603
20.6
33.9
44.8
54.3
Education
Less than High School
217
8.3
15.4
14.3
14.6
High School Graduate
543
26.6
35.4
33.5
35.4
.000 /
Some College
374
24.6
18.0
21.2
27.1
-.138
College Graduate and Above 569
40.5
31.2
31.0
22.9
Income
Below $20,000
339
19.6
29.5
30.0
18.5
.000 /
$20,000 to $50,000
331
21.4
28.6
26.2
37.0
-.152
Above $50,000
619
58.9
41.9
43.8
44.4
Ideology
Liberal
360
13.7
24.1
29.4
27.0
.000 /
Moderate
419
26.2
25.5
27.2
38.2
-.238
Conservative
760
60.1
50.4
43.4
34.8
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
Bivariate Analysis
After classifying the levels of acceptance among certain variables, it is necessary
to determine which demographic and attitudinal characteristics significantly affect
respondent positions. Bivariate analysis was conducted to determine the empirical
relationship between two variables by testing each of the hypotheses. The analysis was
conducted in the following manner: 1) control variable amongst each other variables, 2)
control variables across independent variables, 3) independent variables across the
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intervening variable, 4) independent variables across the dependent variable, and 5) the
intervening variable across the dependent variable.
Race on Education and Income
Control Hypothesis 1 of the model states “Individuals who are white are more
likely to have higher levels of education and higher levels of income, as compared to
individuals who are black.”
For race and education level, 37.9 percent of whites indicated being college
graduates and above, compared to 24.9 of blacks. This percentage difference in race
among college graduates and above is 13.0 percent. The Chi-squared is significant at the
<.001 level, indicating that this relationship between race and education can be
generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 12.
Table 12

Impact of Race on Education

Education
Less than High School
High School Graduate
Some College
College Graduate and Above
Totals
N = 2,454
Chi-squared .001

White
9.1
29.2
23.8
37.9
1,309

Race
Black
13.6
39.6
22.0
24.9
~ 100 ~
273

Other
18.8
30.0
21.4
29.1
872

For race and income level, 53.3 percent of whites indicated earning above
$50,000 per year, compared to 26.7 of blacks. This percentage difference between races
among those who earn above $50,000 per year is 26.6 percent. The Chi-squared is
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significant at the <.001 level, indicating that this relationship between race and income
can be generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 13.
Table 13

Impact of Race on Income

Income
Below $20,000
$20,000 to $50,000
Above $50,000
Totals
N = 1,841
Chi-squared .001

White
22.5
24.2
53.3
975

Race
Black
40.0
33.3
26.7
~ 100 ~
210

Other
34.3
23.2
42.5
656

So, in regards to the impact of race on education and income, the Control
Hypothesis 1 that “Individuals who are white are more likely to have higher levels of
education and higher levels of income, as compared to individuals who are black” is
upheld.
Race on Ideology
Control Hypothesis 2 of the model states “Individuals who are white more likely
to have a conservative ideology, as compared to individuals who are black.”
For race and ideology, 55.7 percent of whites indicated being conservatives,
compared to 41.4 of blacks. This percentage difference between races in conservative
ideology is 14.3 percent. The Chi-squared is significant at the <.001 level, indicating that
this relationship between race and education can be generalized to the entire survey
population although. See Table 14.
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Table 14

Impact of Race on Ideology

Income
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Totals
N = 2,207
Chi-squared .000

White
17.2
27.1
55.7
1183

Race
Black
30.5
28.1
41.4
~ 100 ~
249

Other
26.2
27.4
46.5
775

So, in regards to the impact of race on ideology, the Control Hypothesis 2 that
“Individuals who are white more likely to have a conservative ideology, as compared to
individuals who are black” is upheld.
Education and Income on Ideology
Control Hypothesis 3 of the model states “Individuals with higher levels of
education and higher levels of income are more likely to have a conservative ideology, as
compared to individuals with lower levels of education and lower levels of income.”
For education level and ideology, 51.8 percent of college graduates and above
indicated being conservative, compared to 46.1 of those with less than high school. This
percentage difference between education for conservative ideology is 5.7 percent, and the
Gamma value reflecting the minute relationship between the variables of education and
ideology is only .012. The Chi-squared is significant at the <.025 level, indicating that
this small relationship between education and ideology can be generalized to the entire
survey population. See Table 15.
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Table 15

Impact of Education on Ideology

Ideology

Less than
High
School
21.7
32.2
46.1

Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Totals
N = 2,249
267
Chi-squared .011 Gamma value .012

Education
High
Some
School
College
Graduate
20.6
26.7
25.0
25.6
54.5
47.7
~ 100 ~
661
520

College
Graduate
and Above
19.7
28.5
51.8
801

For income level and ideology, 56.3 percent of those who earned above $50,000
per year indicated being conservative, compared to 50.3 who earned below $20,000. This
percentage difference between income levels with conservative ideology is 6.0 percent,
and the Gamma value reflecting the relationship between the variables of income and
ideology is .125. The Chi-squared is significant at the <.001 level, indicating that this
relationship between income and ideology can be generalized to the entire survey
population. See Table 16.
Table 16
Ideology

Impact of Income on Ideology
Below
$20,000
24.2
25.5
50.3

Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Totals
N = 1,702
459
Chi-squared .000 Gamma value .125
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Income
$20,000$50,000
27.5
27.9
44.6
~ 100 ~
426

Above
$50,000
16.3
27.4
56.3
817

So, in regards to the impact of education and income on ideology, the Control
Hypothesis 3 that “Individuals with higher levels of education and higher levels of
income are more likely to have a conservative ideology, as compared to individuals with
lower levels of education and lower levels of income” is upheld.
Education and Income on Quality of Life
Control Hypothesis 4 of the model states “Individuals with higher levels of
education and higher levels of income are more likely to have a higher quality of life, as
compared to individuals with lower levels of education and lower levels of income.”
For education and quality of life, 91.7 percent of college graduates and above
indicated having a higher quality of life, compared to 62.7 percent of those with less than
high school. This percentage difference between education levels in excellent quality of
life is 29.0 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting the relationship between the
variables of education and quality of life is -.451. The Chi-squared is significant at the
<.001 level, indicating that this relationship between education and quality of life can be
generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 17.
Table 17

Impact of Education on Quality of Life

Quality of Life

Less than
High
School
62.7
29.2
8.2

Excellent
Fair
Poor
Totals
N = 2,495
319
Chi-squared .000 Gamma value -.451
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Education
High
Some
School
College
Graduate
72.6
81.7
23.8
16.0
3.5
2.3
~ 100 ~
764
569

College
Graduate
and Above
91.7
7.5
0.8
843

For income and quality of life, 89.6 percent of those who earned above $50,000
per year indicated having a higher quality of life, compared to 63.6 of those who earned
below $20,000 per year. This percentage difference between income levels in excellent
quality of life is 26.0 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting the relationship between
the variables of income and quality of life is -.513. The Chi-squared is significant at the
<.001 level, indicating that this relationship between income and quality of life can be
generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 18.
Table 18

Impact of Income on Quality of Life

Quality of Life

Below
$20,000
63.6
27.8
8.6

Excellent
Fair
Poor
Totals
N = 1,854
533
Chi-squared .000 Gamma value -.513

Income
$20,000$20,000
77.8
21.4
0.9
~ 100 ~
459

Above
$50,000
89.6
10.0
0.5
862

So, in regards to the impact of education and income on quality of life, the
Control Hypothesis 4 that “Individuals with higher levels of education and higher levels
of income are more likely to have a higher quality of life, as compared to individuals with
lower levels of education and lower levels of income” is upheld.
Education and Income on Trust in Government
Control Hypothesis 5 of the model states “Individuals with higher levels of
education and higher levels of income are less likely to trust the government, as
compared to individuals with lower levels of education and lower levels of income.”
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For education and trust in government, 27.6 percent of college graduates and
above indicated that they rarely trust the government, compared to 36.7 percent of those
with less than high school. This percentage difference in education among those who
rarely trust the government is 9.1 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting the
relationship between the variables of education and quality of life is -.071. The Chisquared is significant at the <.025 level, indicating that this relationship between
education and trust in government can be generalized to the entire survey population,
although the direction of the relationship is opposite from what was hypothesized. See
Table 19.
Table 19

Impact of Education on Trust in Government

Trust in Government

Less than
High
School
25.9
37.4
36.7

Most of the Time
Sometimes
Rarely
Totals
N = 2,445
313
Chi-squared .017 Gamma value -.071

Education
High
Some
School
College
Graduate
29.7
25.8
36.8
41.8
33.6
32.4
~ 100 ~
748
555

College
Graduate
and Above
31.2
41.1
27.6
829

For income and trust in government, 29.5 percent of those who earned above
$50,000 per year indicated that they rarely trust the government, compared to 34.8 of
those who earned below $20,000 per year. This percentage difference in income among
those who rarely trust the government is 5.3 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting the
relationship between the variables of income and trust in government is -.074. The Chisquared is significant at the <.001 level, indicating that this relationship between income
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and trust in government can be generalized to the entire survey population, although the
direction of the relationship is opposite from what was hypothesized. See Table 20.
Table 20

Impact of Income on Trust in Government

Trust in Government

Below
$20,000
29.0
36.2
34.8

Most of the Time
Sometimes
Rarely
Totals
N = 1,827
520
Chi-squared .001 Gamma value -.074

Income
$20,000 to
$50,000
23.0
45.7
31.3
~ 100 ~
453

Above
$50,000
32.2
38.3
29.5
854

So, in regards to the impact of education and income on trust in government, the
Control Hypothesis 5 that “Individuals with higher levels of education and higher levels
of income are less likely to trust the government, as compared to individuals with lower
levels of education and lower levels of income” is not upheld.
Ideology on Quality of Life
Control Hypothesis 6 of the model states “Individuals who have a conservative
ideology are more likely to have a higher quality of life, as compared to individuals who
have a liberal ideology.”
For ideology and quality of life, 81.2 percent of conservatives indicated having a
higher quality of life, compared to 79.4 of liberals. This percentage difference in ideology
among excellent quality of life is 1.8 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting the
relationship between the variables of ideology and quality of life is -.047. The Chisquared is not significant at the <.050 level, indicating that this relationship between
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ideology and quality of life cannot be generalized to the entire survey population. See
Table 21.
Table 21

Impact of Ideology on Quality of Life

Quality of Life

Liberal
79.4
17.5
3.1

Excellent
Fair
Poor
Totals
N = 2,242
486
Chi-squared .826 Gamma value -.047

Ideology
Moderate
79.2
18.0
2.8
~ 100 ~
615

Conservative
81.2
16.1
2.6
1,141

So, in regards to the impact of ideology on quality of life, the Control Hypothesis
6 that “Individuals who have a conservative ideology are more likely to have a higher
quality of life, as compared to individuals who have a liberal ideology” is not upheld.
Ideology on Community Involvement
Control Hypothesis 7 of the model states “Individuals who have a conservative
ideology are more likely to be actively involved in their community, as compared to
individuals who have a liberal ideology.”
For ideology and community involvement, 56.7 percent of conservatives
indicated being active in their community, compared to 49.4 for liberals. This percentage
difference in ideology among active community involvement is 7.3 percent, and the
Gamma value reflecting the relationship between the variables of ideology and
community involvement is -.117. The Chi-squared is significant at the <.025 level,
indicating that this relationship between ideology and community involvement can be
generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 22.
61

Table 22

Impact of Ideology on Community Involvement

Community Involvement

Liberal
49.4
5.5
45.1

Active
Neither Active nor Inactive
Inactive
Totals
N = 2,255
492
Chi-squared .002 Gamma value -.117

Ideology
Moderate
50.0
8.5
41.5
~ 100 ~
614

Conservative
56.7
7.3
35.9
1,149

So, in regards to the impact of ideology on community involvement, the Control
Hypothesis 7 that “Individuals who have a conservative ideology are more likely to be
actively involved in their community, as compared to individuals who have a liberal
ideology” is upheld.
Ideology on Trust in Government
Control Hypothesis 8 of the model states “Individuals who have a conservative
ideology are less likely to trust the government, as compared to individuals who have a
liberal ideology.”
For ideology and trust in government, 36.4 percent of conservatives indicated that
they rarely trust the government, compared to 24.5 for liberals. This percentage
difference between ideologies for those who rarely trust the government is 11.9 percent,
and the Gamma value reflecting the relationship between the variables of ideology and
community involvement is .154. The Chi-squared is significant at the <.001 level,
indicating that this relationship between ideology and trust in government can be
generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 23.
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Table 23

Impact of Ideology on Trust in Government

Trust in Government

Liberal
31.4
44.1
24.5

Most of the Time
Sometimes
Rarely
Totals
N = 2,217
481
Chi-squared < .000 Gamma value .154

Ideology
Moderate
34.7
40.4
24.9
~ 100 ~
611

Conservative
26.1
37.4
36.4
1,125

So, in regards to the impact of ideology on trust in government, the Control
Hypothesis 8 that “Individuals who have a conservative ideology are less likely to trust
the government, as compared to individuals who have a liberal ideology” is upheld.
Quality of Life on Disaster Impact and Disaster Responsibility
Independent Hypothesis 1 of the model states “Individuals with a higher quality
of life are more likely to indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact on them as
compared to individuals with a lower quality of life.”
For quality of life level and disaster impact, 78.5 percent of those who rated their
quality of life as excellent indicated having no or a low disaster impact, compared to 59.7
of those who rated their quality of life as poor. This percentage difference in quality of
life among no or a low disaster impact is 18.8 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting
the relationship between the variables of quality of life and disaster impact is .269. The
Chi-squared is significant at the <.001 level, indicating that this relationship between
quality of life and disaster impact can be generalized to the entire survey population. See
Table 24.
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Table 24

Impact of Quality of Life on Disaster Impact

Disaster Impact

Excellent
78.5
11.3
10.3

None or Low
Medium
High
Totals
N = 2,439
1,960
Chi-squared .000 Gamma value .269

Quality of Life
Fair
68.1
16.5
15.5
~ 100 ~
407

Poor
59.7
13.9
26.4
72

So, in regards to the impact of quality of life on disaster impact, the Independent
Hypothesis 1 “Individuals with a higher quality of life are more likely to indicate that the
oil spill had no or a low impact on them as compared to individuals with a lower quality
of life,” is upheld.
Independent Hypothesis 2 of the model states “Individuals with a higher quality
of life are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves should assume the majority
of responsibility as compared to individuals with a lower quality of life.”
For quality of life level and disaster responsibility, 31.9 percent of those who
rated their quality of life as excellent indicated that victims themselves should assume
responsibility following a disaster, compared to 22.0 of those who rated their quality of
life as fair. This percentage difference between quality of life levels for believing that
victims themselves should assume disaster responsibility is 9.9 percent. The Chi-squared
is significant at the <.025 level, indicating that this relationship between quality of life
and disaster responsibility may somewhat be generalized to the entire survey population.
The small sample size of those having a poor quality of life limits the ability to generalize
about this small group. See Table 25.
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Table 25

Impact of Quality of Life on Disaster Responsibility

Disaster Responsibility
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 1,728
Chi-squared .008

Excellent
31.9
18.2
44.2
5.7
1382

Quality of Life
Fair
22.0
16.1
56.1
5.9
~ 100 ~
305

Poor
34.1
19.5
39.0
7.3
41

So, in regards to the impact of quality of life on disaster responsibility, the
Independent Hypothesis 2 “Individuals with a higher quality of life are more likely to
indicate that the victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility as
compared to individuals with a lower quality of life” is upheld.
Community Involvement on Disaster Impact and Disaster Responsibility
Independent Hypothesis 3 of the model states “Individuals who are actively
involved in their community are more likely to indicate that the oil spill had no or a low
impact on them as compared to individuals who are not actively involved in their
community.”
For community involvement and disaster impact, 74.6 percent of those who are
active in their community indicated having no or a low disaster impact, compared to 76.1
of those who are inactive. This percentage difference in community involvement among
no or a low disaster impact is 1.5 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting the
relationship between the variables of community involvement and disaster impact is .059. The Chi-squared is not significant at the <.050 level, indicating that this small
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relationship between community involvement and disaster impact cannot be generalized
to the entire survey population. See Table 26.
Table 26

Impact of Community Involvement on Disaster Impact

Disaster Impact

Active

None or Low
74.6
Medium
12.8
High
12.6
Totals
N = 2,446
1,256
Chi-squared .239 Gamma value -.059

Community Involvement
Neither Active
Inactive
nor Inactive
80.9
76.1
11.6
11.3
7.5
11.6
~ 100 ~
173
1,017

So, in regards to the impact of community involvement on disaster impact, the
Independent Hypothesis 3 “Individuals who are actively involved in their community are
more likely to indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact on them as compared to
individuals who are not actively involved in their community” is not upheld.
Independent Hypothesis 4 of the model states “Individuals who are actively
involved in their community are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves
should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who are not
actively involved in their community.”
For community involvement and disaster responsibility, 29.8 percent of those who
are active in their community indicated that victims themselves should assume
responsibility following a disaster, compared to 30.4 of those who are inactive. This
percentage difference between community involvement levels in believing victims
themselves should assume disaster responsibility is .6 percent. The Chi-squared is not
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significant at the <.050 level, indicating that this tiny relationship between community
involvement and disaster responsibility cannot be generalized to the entire survey
population. See Table 27.
Table 27

Impact of Community Involvement on Disaster Responsibility

Disaster Responsibility
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 1,727
Chi-squared .080

Active
29.8
17.4
47.1
5.7
892

Community Involvement
Neither Active
Inactive
nor Inactive
30.8
30.4
28.2
17.3
38.5
46.1
2.6
6.3
~ 100 ~
117
718

So, in regards to the impact of community involvement on and disaster
responsibility, the Independent Hypothesis 4 “Individuals who are actively involved in
their community are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves should assume
the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who are not actively involved in
their community” is not upheld.
Trust in Government on Disaster Impact and Disaster Responsibility
Independent Hypothesis 5 of the model states “Individuals who are less likely to
trust the government are more likely to indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact
on them as compared to individuals who are more likely to trust in government.”
For trust in government and disaster impact, 74.0 percent of those who rarely trust
the government indicated having no or a low disaster impact, compared to 76.4 of those
who most of the time trust the government. This percentage difference in trust in
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government among disaster impact is 2.4 percent, and the Gamma value reflecting the
relationship between the variables of trust in government and disaster impact is .057. The
Chi-squared is significant at the <.025 level, indicating that this relationship between
trust in government and disaster impact can be generalized to the entire survey population
although the direction of the relationship is opposite from what was hypothesized. See
Table 28.
Table 28

Impact of Trust in Government on Disaster Impact

Disaster Impact

Most of the
Time
76.4
13.8
9.8

None or Low
Medium
High
Totals
N = 2,395
683
Chi-squared .010 Gamma value .057

Trust in Government
Sometimes
77.2
11.8
11.0
~ 100 ~
955

Rarely
74.0
10.8
15.2
757

So, in regards to the impact of trust in government on disaster impact, the
Independent Hypothesis 5 “Individuals who are less likely to trust the government are
more likely to indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact on them as compared to
individuals who are more likely to trust in government” is not upheld, as the percentage
differences are very small and opposite to what was hypothesized.
Independent Hypothesis 6 of the model states “Individuals who are less likely to
trust the government are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves should
assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who are more likely to
trust in government.”
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For trust in government and disaster responsibility, 38.3 percent of those who
rarely trust the government indicated that victims themselves should assume
responsibility following a disaster, compared to 22.6 of those who most of the time trust
the government. This percentage difference between trust in government level in those
believing victims themselves should assume disaster responsibility is 15.7 percent. The
Chi-squared is significant at the <.001 level, indicating that this relationship between
trust in government and disaster responsibility can be generalized to the entire survey
population. See Table 29.
Table 29

Impact of Trust in Government on Disaster Responsibility

Disaster Responsibility
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 1,689
Chi-squared .000

Most of the
Time
22.6
14.4
56.7
6.3
522

Trust in Government
Sometimes
28.7
20.3
45.0
5.9
~ 100 ~
644

Rarely
38.3
19.4
37.0
5.3
532

So, in regards to the impact of trust in government on disaster responsibility, the
Independent Hypothesis 6 “Individuals who are less likely to trust the government are
more likely to indicate that the victims themselves should assume the majority of
responsibility as compared to individuals who are more likely to trust in government” is
upheld.
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Disaster Impact on Disaster Responsibility
Independent Hypothesis 7 of the model states “Individuals who indicate that the
oil spill had no or a low impact on them are more likely to indicate that the victims
themselves should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who
indicate the oil spill had a high impact on them.”
For disaster impact and disaster responsibility, 30.2 percent of those indicated that
the oil spill had no or a low impact on them also indicated that victims themselves should
assume responsibility following a disaster, compared to 31.9 who experienced a high
impact. This percentage difference in disaster impact among disaster responsibility is
only 1.7 percent. The Chi-squared is significant at the <.025 level, indicating that this
minute relationship between disaster impact and disaster responsibility can be generalized
to the entire survey population, but the direction of the weak relationship is the opposite
from the hypothesis. See Table 30.
Table 30

Impact of Disaster Impact on Disaster Responsibility

Disaster Responsibility
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 1,658
Chi-squared .021

No or Low
30.2
17.3
46.1
6.4
1,286

Disaster Impact
Medium
28.9
20.5
47.4
3.2
~ 100 ~
190

High
31.9
24.7
41.8
1.6
182

So, in regards to the impact of disaster impact on disaster responsibility, the
Independent Hypothesis 7 “Individuals who indicate that the oil spill had no or a low
impact on them are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves should assume the
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majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who indicate the oil spill had a high
impact on them” is not upheld, as the percentage differences are very small, and opposite
to what was hypothesized.
Multivariate Analysis
After determining the empirical relationship between each of the control,
independent, intervening, and dependent variables, it was necessary to control for the
importance of which independent variables influence the dependent variable. Multivariate
analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between a predictor and the
dependent variable, after taking into effect the impact of a second predictor.
Quality of Life and Disaster Impact on Disaster Responsibility
The independent variable of quality of life, the intervening variable of disaster
impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility were analyzed together and
suggest that 31.9 percent of those who rated their quality of life as excellent and
experienced no or a low disaster impact also expressed that the victims themselves should
assume the majority of responsibility following a disaster. This is a 3.8 percentage
difference from those who experienced a high disaster impact at 35.7. The Chi-squared is
significant at the <.025 level, indicating that this relationship between disaster impact and
disaster responsibility among those who rated their quality of life as excellent can be
generalized to the entire survey population, although the direction of the relationship is
opposite from what was hypothesized. See Table 31.
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Table 31

Disaster Impact Difference in Disaster Responsibility by Quality of Life Excellent

Quality of Life /
Disaster Responsibility
Excellent
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 1,331
Chi-squared .017

Disaster Impact
None or Low
31.9
17.7
44.0
6.5
1,058

Medium
29.9
23.8
45.6
0.7
~ 100 ~
147

High
35.7
19.0
43.7
1.6
126

The independent variable of quality of life, the intervening variable of disaster
impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility were analyzed together and
suggest that 20.4 percent of those who rated their quality of life as fair and experienced
no or a low disaster impact also expressed that the victims themselves should assume the
majority of responsibility following a disaster. This is a 5.1 percentage difference from
those who experienced a high disaster impact at 25.5. The Chi-squared is significant at
the <.05 level, indicating that this relationship between disaster impact and disaster
responsibility among those who rated their quality of life as fair can be generalized to the
entire survey population, although the direction of the relationship is opposite from what
was hypothesized. See Table 32.
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Table 32

Disaster Impact Difference in Disaster Responsibility by Quality of Life Fair

Quality of Life /
Disaster Responsibility
Fair
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 281
Chi-squared .041

Disaster Impact
None or Low
20.4
15.3
59.2
5.1
196

Medium
23.7
10.5
52.6
13.2
~ 100 ~
38

High
25.5
29.8
42.6
2.1
47

The independent variable of quality of life, the intervening variable of disaster
impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility for those who rated their
quality of life as poor and experienced no or a low disaster impact and also expressed that
the victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility following a disaster
was not analyzed given that the sample size was too small to make any generalizations
regardless of statistical significance.
Hence, the Independent Hypotheses 7 “Individuals who indicate that the oil spill
had no or a low impact on them are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves
should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who indicate the
oil spill had a high impact on them” as related to quality of life is not upheld since the
relationship is reversed.
Community Involvement and Disaster Impact on Disaster Responsibility
The independent variable of community involvement, the intervening variable of
disaster impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility were analyzed
together and suggest that 30.3 percent of those who indicated that they are active in their
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community and experienced no or a low disaster impact also expressed that the victims
themselves should assume the majority of responsibility following a disaster. This is a 1.0
percentage difference from those who experienced a high disaster impact at 29.3. The
Chi-squared is significant at the <.025 level, indicating that this relationship between
disaster impact and disaster responsibility among those who indicated that they are active
in their community can be generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 33.
Table 33

Disaster Impact Difference in Disaster Responsibility by Community
Involvement - Active

Community Involvement /
Disaster Responsibility
Active
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 852
Chi-squared .004

Disaster Impact
None or Low
30.3
15.2
48.1
6.4
653

Medium
27.0
24.0
48.0
1.0
~ 100 ~
100

High
29.3
27.3
42.4
1.0
99

The independent variable of community involvement, the intervening variable of
disaster impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility for those who
indicated that they are neither active nor inactive in their community and experienced no
or a low disaster impact and also expressed that the victims themselves should assume the
majority of responsibility following a disaster was not analyzed given that the sample
size was too small to make any generalizations regardless of statistical significance.
The independent variable of community involvement, the intervening variable of
disaster impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility were analyzed
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together and suggest that 30.3 percent of those who indicated that they are inactive in
their community and experienced no or a low disaster impact also expressed that the
victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility following a disaster.
This is a 4.0 percentage difference from those who experienced a high disaster impact at
34.3. The Chi-squared is not significant at the <.05 level, indicating that this relationship
between disaster impact and disaster responsibility among those who indicated that they
are inactive in their community cannot be generalized to the entire survey population. See
Table 34.
Table 34

Disaster Impact Difference in Disaster Responsibility by Community
Involvement – Inactive

Community Involvement /
Disaster Responsibility
Inactive
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 684
Chi-squared .718

Disaster Impact
None or Low
30.3
17.7
45.2
6.9
538

Medium
30.3
17.1
44.7
7.9
~ 100 ~
76

High
34.3
20.0
44.3
1.4
70

Hence, the Independent Hypotheses 7 “Individuals who indicate that the oil spill
had no or a low impact on them are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves
should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who indicate the
oil spill had a high impact on them” as related to community involvement is not upheld,
as the percentage differences are very small or not statistically significant.

75

Trust in Government and Disaster Impact on Disaster Responsibility
The independent variable of trust in government, the intervening variable of
disaster impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility were analyzed
together and suggest that 25.5 percent of those who indicated that they most of the time
trust the government and experienced no or a low disaster impact also expressed that the
victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility following a disaster.
This is a 17.0 percentage difference from those who experienced a high disaster impact at
8.5. The Chi-squared is significant at the <.001 level, indicating that this relationship
between disaster impact and disaster responsibility among those who indicated that they
most of the time trust the government can be generalized to the entire survey population.
This is the one condition under which Independent Hypothesis 7 is upheld. See Table 35.
Table 35

Disaster Impact Difference in Disaster Responsibility by Trust in
Government – Most of the Time

Trust in Government /
Disaster Responsibility
Most of the Time
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 490
Chi-squared .001

Disaster Impact
None or Low
25.5
11.8
57.2
5.5
381

Medium
19.4
19.4
53.2
8.1
~ 100 ~
62

High
8.5
34.0
55.3
2.1
47

The independent variable of trust in government, the intervening variable of
disaster impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility were analyzed
together and suggest that 26.7 percent of those who indicated that they sometimes trust
the government and experienced no or a low disaster impact also expressed that the
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victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility following a disaster.
This is a 6.6 percentage difference from those who experienced a high disaster impact at
33.3. The Chi-squared is not significant at the <.05 level, indicating that this relationship
between disaster impact and disaster responsibility among those who indicated that they
sometimes trust the government cannot be generalized to the entire survey population.
See Table 36.
Table 36

Disaster Impact Difference in Disaster Responsibility by Trust in
Government - Sometimes

Community Involvement /
Disaster Responsibility
Sometimes
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 629
Chi-squared .201

Disaster Impact
None or Low
26.7
20.0
46.1
7.3
495

Medium
33.8
23.9
40.8
1.4
~ 100 ~
71

High
33.3
19.0
46.0
1.6
63

The independent variable of trust in government, the intervening variable of
disaster impact, and the dependent variable of disaster responsibility were analyzed
together and suggest that 38.2 percent of those who indicated that they rarely trust the
government and experienced no or a low disaster impact also expressed that the victims
themselves should assume the majority of responsibility following a disaster. This is a 8.9
percentage difference from those who experienced a high disaster impact at 47.1. The
Chi-squared is not significant at the <.05 level, indicating that this relationship between
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disaster impact and disaster responsibility among those who indicated that they rarely
trust the government cannot be generalized to the entire survey population. See Table 36.
Table 37

Disaster Impact Difference in Disaster Responsibility by Trust in
Government - Rarely

Trust in Government /
Disaster Responsibility
Rarely
Victims Themselves
Private Organizations
Government Agencies
Nonprofit Organizations
Totals
N = 510
Chi-squared .200

Disaster Impact
None or Low
38.2
19.5
36.1
6.2
385

Medium
32.7
18.2
47.3
1.8
~ 100 ~
55

High
47.1
21.4
30.0
1.4
70

Hence, the Independent Hypotheses 7 “Individuals who indicate that the oil spill
had no or a low impact on them are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves
should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who indicate the
oil spill had a high impact on them” as related to trust in government is partially upheld
specifically for those who most of the time trust the government.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

Significance of Study
Public matters traditionally center on issues brought to the forefront of or actively
undertaken by the government to: regulate commerce, promote financial stability,
conduct foreign relations, provide for a common defense, and protect the rights and
interest of its citizens (Eitzen and Zinn, 2006). The root causes of societal problems are
often hidden away by a vast amount of intricacies. Given the realities of everyday life,
the extent of social beliefs and political attitudes vary (Erikson and Tedin, 2007; Beierle
and Konisky, 2000). Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1979) maintain that the fabric of society
changes, and, in effect, changes “the public response to that change;” thus, the
consistency of the public remaining the same on each and every issue is nearly
impossible (p1). First, ideologies differ among a range of social issues, and, second, the
length of time surrounding a particular issue automatically superimposes political
importance. Ideology, at its very core, is self-identification, and, as such, heeds a vested
policy interest (Etzioni, 2000; Burstein, 2003). Per Wamsley (1998), a public philosophy
as a continuum of concerns should be aspired that exhibits:
“a particular expression of social and political life...” that “occupies the
intellectual space between philosophy in all its breadth [sic], and theory, which
has come to have such a functionalist, positivist, and explanatory connotations...
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And although a public philosophy is also affected by false consciousness created
by ideology like any other aspect of society, still it connotes reflection and
inquiry, whereas ideology is meant to overcome both and commit persons to a
line of thought or action” (p361).
Ideologies “emerge in societies… to enhance coherence, “ and, thus,
“simultaneously reveal and conceal something about the conditions which give birth to
them, and, insofar as they conceal or obscure these conditions in thought, they tend to
stabilize or perpetuate them in reality” (Wamsley 1998, p359). Characterizing societal
issues is a critical factor in defining problems as it can serve as an effective tool to
“typify” the dilemma and gain an advantage in public support. Yet, “problem definition is
about much more than just finding someone or something to blame… [for] a situation’s
perceived social [and political] significance, meaning, implications, and urgency” often
dramatizes what is at play and what is at stake (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994, p3). Such an
effort, thus, “require[s] a careful blending of [history,] science, and [skill]” with the input
by the government and citizens to make sound legislation (Bonser, McGregor, and Oster,
2000, p272).
As a complex, process oriented activity, policymaking is the translation of
social and political issues into governmental regulation and law (Beierle and Konisky,
2000; Smith and Larimer, 2009; Birkland, 2005; Dye, 2008). Per Bosner, McGregor,
and Oster (2000), “In the simplest form, the policy process is a cycle of problem-solving
activity involving problem definition, deciding on a policy response to the problem, and
acting on the decision” (p65). Incorporating a wide range of decisional premises and
contextual circumstances, policymaking is exceptionally broad and a slow and gradual
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process (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994; Kraft and Furlong 2007; Baumgartner and Jones,
1991; Lindblom, 1959; Lasswell, 1956). Policymakers, therefore, rely heavily on the
policy analysts “for a careful blending of” historical, management, and scientific
expertise in seeking credible, interdisciplinary solutions when dealing with a vast array of
significant, societal problems (Bonser, McGregor, and Oster, 2000, p272).
Policymaking “is popularly described by the rational model of decision-making:
[that] when faced with a problem, the decision maker” follows a gradual process of
identifying a problem, establishing goals, creating alternatives, noting consequences,
weighing costs and benefits, and monitoring progress (White, 1999, p66; Birkland, 2005;
Smith and Larimer, 2009). Rather, decisions are evaluated in a relative sense with a
particular objective. A change in the objective can, subsequently, cause a change in the
evaluation of a decision. Decisions are complex admixtures of facts and values—
decisions can be good, but not necessarily true or decisions can be true but not
necessarily good. Factual statements are about the observable world and how it operates,
which can be tested for true or false. Value statements are descriptive of a future state of
affairs; they may or may not be factual in a strict empirical sense, but they possess an
imperative quality. Therefore, fact and value seem to leave no room for judgment in
decision making. As such, most ethical propositions have admixed with them factual
elements, and every inclusion and omission included within an opinion. Communication
and understanding are, therefore, key features in any process where decisional premises
are being transmitted, especially among the fundamental activities occurring within a
community.
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Intellectual Merit
Policymakers have attempted to reduce the impacts associated with disasters by
anticipating the unexpected; however, it is easy to under analyze the complexities of
emergency management activities (Petak, 1985). First, disasters occur within fairly
narrow settings and a limited geographical scope, which prohibit policymakers from
making sound solutions. Second, traditional disaster management models developed by
policymakers have typically focused on post-crisis response and recovery lessons learned
from terrorist attacks, diverting attentions away from evaluating current practices or
adopting new procedures until there is an imminent crisis (Wallace and DeBalough,
1985). And, third, policymakers are unequipped to handle many of the economic, health,
and environmental elements of disasters, as well as incapable of fully seizing many of its
social and political attributes (Weichselgartner, 2001; deLeon, 1999). Thus, given the
limited opportunities for disaster-related experience, “decision-making, mental models,
and situational awareness research on [crises] have highlighted a further need for
effective emergency management” (Paton and Jackson, 2002, p115). Understanding the
meaning, causality, severity, and incidence of disasters, both implied and actual, is
essential to the problem-solving process (Birkland, 2006). Disaster planning, thus, needs
to be investigated in terms of decisional premises so that a more comprehensive diagram
of social and political resiliency can be developed (Brandsen, Boogers, and Tops, 2006;
Brewer, 1974).
Discussion of Findings
This study was designed to provide statistical estimates about how social capital
and political trust impact disaster responsibility with regard for the demographic
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background. The following hypotheses were made. First, individuals who are white will
have higher levels of education and income and a conservative ideology. Second,
individuals who have higher levels of education and income will tend to have a
conservative ideology, higher quality of life, and be less likely to trust the government.
Third, individuals who are conservative will have a higher quality of life, be more
actively involved in their community, and be less likely to trust the government. Fourth,
individuals with a higher quality of life, who are actively involved in their community,
and who are less likely to trust the government will indicate that the oil spill had no or a
low impact on them. And, fifth, individuals with a higher quality of life, who are actively
involved in their community, and who are less likely to trust the government will indicate
that that the victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility.
According to results from the research investigation, however, not all of the
assumed hypotheses were upheld. First, it was found that race has a significant impact
upon education, income, and ideology. Second, it was found that while education and
income have a significant impact on ideology and quality of life, it does not have a
significant impact upon trust in government. Third, it was found that while ideology does
not have a significant impact upon quality of life, it does upon community involvement
and trust in government. Fourth, it was found that quality of life has a significant impact
upon disaster impact but not disaster responsibility. Fifth, it was found that community
involvement does not have a significant impact upon disaster impact and disaster
responsibility. Sixth, it was found that while trust in government does not have a
significant impact upon disaster impact, it does have a significant impact upon disaster
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responsibility. And, seventh, it was found that disaster impact does not have a significant
impact upon disaster responsibility.
To address for these findings and better reflect the actuality behind possible social
capital and political trust characteristics that impact disaster responsibility, the model and
hypothesis have been adjusted.

Figure 3

Redrawn Model

Reworked Hypotheses
For Control Hypothesis 1, it was found that race has a significant impact upon
education and income. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals who are white are more
likely to have higher levels of education and higher levels of income, as compared to
individuals who are black” is upheld, and no changes have been more to the hypothesis or
model to reflect these results.
For Control Hypothesis 2, it was found that race has a significant impact upon
ideology. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals who are white are more likely to have a
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conservative ideology, as compared to individuals who are black” is upheld, and no
changes have been to the hypothesis or model to reflect these results.
For Control Hypothesis 3, it was found that education and income have a
significant impact upon ideology. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals with higher
levels of education and higher levels of income are more likely to have a conservative
ideology, as compared to individuals with lower levels of education and lower levels of
income” is upheld, and no changes have been made to the hypothesis to reflect these
results.
For Control Hypothesis 4, it was found that education and income have a
significant impact upon quality of life. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals with higher
levels of education and higher levels of income are more likely to have a higher quality of
life, as compared to individuals with lower levels of education and lower levels of
income” is upheld, and no changes have been made to the hypothesis to reflect these
results.
For Control Hypothesis 5, it was found that education and income do not have a
significant impact upon trust in government. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals with
higher levels of education and higher levels of income are less likely to trust the
government, as compared to individuals with lower levels of education and lower levels
of income” is not upheld, and this hypothesis has been removed to reflect these results.
For Control Hypothesis 6, it was found that ideology does not have a significant
impact upon quality of life. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals who have a
conservative ideology are more likely to have a higher quality of life, as compared to
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individuals who have a liberal ideology” is not upheld, and this hypothesis has been
removed to reflect these results.
For Control Hypothesis 7, it was found that ideology does have a significant
impact upon community involvement. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals who have a
conservative ideology are more likely to be actively involved in their community, as
compared to individuals who have a liberal ideology” is upheld, however, this hypothesis
has been removed to reflect that results that community involvement does not have a
significant impact upon disaster impact or disaster responsibility.
For Control Hypothesis 8, it was found that ideology does have a significant
impact upon trust in government. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals who have a
conservative ideology are less likely to trust the government, as compared to individuals
who have a liberal ideology” is upheld, and no changes have been made to the model and
hypothesis to reflect these results.
For Independent Hypothesis 1, it was found that quality of life does not have a
significant impact upon disaster impact. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals with a
higher quality of life are more likely to indicate that the oil spill had no or a low impact
on them as compared to individuals with a lower quality of life” is not upheld, and this
hypothesis has been removed to reflect that results that disaster impact does not have a
significant impact upon disaster responsibility, except among those trusting in
government.
For Independent Hypothesis 2, it was found that quality of life does have a
significant impact upon disaster responsibility. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals
with a higher quality of life are more likely to indicate that the victims themselves should
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assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals with a lower quality of
life” is upheld, and no changes have been made to the model and hypothesis to reflect
these results.
For Independent Hypothesis 3, it was found that community involvement does not
have a significant impact upon disaster impact. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals
who are actively involved in their community are more likely to indicate that the oil spill
had no or a low impact on them as compared to individuals who are not actively involved
in their community” is not upheld, and the hypothesis has been removed to reflect these
results.
For Independent Hypothesis 4, it was found that community involvement does not
have a significant impact upon disaster responsibility. Thus, the hypothesis that
“Individuals who are actively involved in their community are more likely to indicate that
the victims themselves should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to
individuals who are not actively involved in their community” is not upheld, and the
hypothesis has been removed to reflect these results.
For Independent Hypothesis 5, it was found that trust in government does not
have a significant impact upon disaster impact. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals
who are less likely to trust the government are more likely to indicate that the oil spill had
a low impact on them as compared to individuals who are more likely to trust in
government” is rejected, and this hypothesis has been removed to reflect that results that
disaster impact does not have a significant impact upon disaster responsibility.
For Independent Hypothesis 6, it was found that trust in government does have a
significant impact upon disaster responsibility. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals
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who are less likely to trust the government are more likely to indicate that the victims
themselves should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who
are more likely to trust in government” is upheld, and no changes have been made to the
model and hypothesis to reflect these results.
For Independent Hypothesis 7, it was found that disaster impact does not have a
significant impact upon disaster responsibility, except among those most trusting of
government. Thus, the hypothesis that “Individuals Individuals who indicate that the oil
spill had no or a low impact on them are more likely to indicate that the victims
themselves should assume the majority of responsibility as compared to individuals who
indicate the oil spill had a high impact on them” is not upheld, and the hypothesis has
been removed to reflect these results.
Recommendations
The complexity of hazards is so great, that becoming resilient to disasters requires
a holistic approach (McEntire, 2001; Nelson, 2006). It is axiomatic that the more
advanced civilizations become, the more complex disasters become. Since disasters are
typically dynamic and fluid in nature, there is a need for an improved means of
understanding not only the governmental but also the communal response to disasters
(Gregory, McDaniels, and Fields, 2001; Henstra, 2010). This is especially the case for
technological disasters, such as in the aftermath of the DwH oil spill, leaving a number of
social and political impacts unanswered (Kurtz, 2008). Inclination among policymakers
should, therefore, be to view emergency management as an integrated framework, taking
into account all levels of governmental activity as well as consideration for communal
attitudes, beliefs, and practices. Given the impact of social capital and political trust on
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democratic citizens and governance, it is essential to know what influences the public’s
perception of disaster responsibility (Vigoda, 2002; Irvin and Stansbury, 2004; Page and
Shapiro, 1983; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey, 1987). See Figure 4.

Figure 4

Social and Political Resiliency Model

Co-operation in times of disasters should, therefore, be recognized as important
and viewed as a relevant means to ideological bridge building that aims to strengthen
cohesion and confidence so that a more effective and integrated approach to disaster
planning can be developed (Kouzmin, Alan, and Rosenthal, 1995; Trim, 2004; Tierney,
Lindell, and Perry, 2001; Drabek, 2006).
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Social Capital Questions
How would you rate your quality of life? Would you say:
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Don’t know/not sure
6. Refused
How likely are you to recommend your community to a friend or associate as a place to
live? Would you say:
1. Very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Neither likely nor unlikely
4. Somewhat unlikely
5. Very unlikely
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
How active would you say you are in your community, such as in local government or
volunteer organizations? Are you:
1. Very active
2. Somewhat active
3. Neither active nor inactive
4. Somewhat inactive
5. Very inactive
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
Political Trust Questions
In general, how often do you trust the government to do what is right? Would you say:
1. Almost always
2. Most of the time
3. Some of the time
4. Rarely
5. Never
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
In general, how often do you feel like your local officials would listen to you if you
talked to them about a policy issue? Would you say:
1. Almost always
2. Most of the time
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Some of the time
Rarely
Never
Don’t know/not sure
Refused

When responding to disasters, how prepared do you think the federal government is today
as compared to its response following Hurricane Katrina? Would you say:
1. Much better
2. Somewhat better
3. About the same
4. Somewhat worse
5. Much worse
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
How much confidence do you have in the evacuation notices issued by government
officials prior to an approaching hurricane? Would you say:
1. A great deal
2. Quite a bit
3. Just some
4. Only a little
5. None at all
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
How much confidence do you have in the storm predictions issued by weather forecasters
prior to an approaching hurricane? Would you say:
1. A great deal
2. Quite a bit
3. Just some
4. Only a little
5. None at all
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
Policy Beliefs Questions
Following a disaster, who should assume the majority of the responsibility for taking care
of victims and their families?
1. The victims themselves
2. Privately funded organizations such as the Red Cross, Salvation Army,
churches, etc.
3. Government agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency
4. Non-profits organizations
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5.
6.
7.
8.

Combination/shared responsibility
Other --- specify
Don’t know/not sure
Refused

Which of the following is most important to you?
1. Protecting coastal wetlands and wildlife
2. Continuing offshore drilling and oil production
3. Neither
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
Would you support a one-quarter cent increase in state sales tax to pay for disaster
preparedness or emergency management?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know/not sure
4. Refused
Disaster Impact and Disaster Responsibility Questions
Before the oil spill, how supportive were you of offshore oil drilling? Would you say:
1. Very supportive
2. Somewhat supportive
3. Not supportive
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
What about offshore oil drilling in the future? Would you say:
1. Very supportive
2. Somewhat supportive
3. Not supportive
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
Who do you think was most at fault for the oil spill in the Gulf? Would you say:
1. British Petroleum
2. Unites States Government
3. Haliburton
4. Transocean
5. Cameron International
6. Other --- specify
7. Don’t know/not sure
8. Refused
103

Who do you think was most responsible for cleaning up the oil spill? Would you say:
1. British Petroleum
2. Haliburton
3. Transocean
4. Cameron International
5. Federal Government
6. State Government
7. Local Government
8. Local Community
9. Other --- specify
10. Don’t know/not sure
11. Refused
Please tell me if the following individuals and organizations were very effective,
somewhat effective, or not at all effective at all in their response to the oil spill.
British Petroleum
1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not too effective
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
The oil and gas industry overall
1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not too effective
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
President Obama
1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not too effective
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
The federal government
1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not too effective
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
Which of the following statement best describes your opinion regarding the oil spill? The
oil spill was:
1. The result of a mechanical failure that can be corrected with better
engineering
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2. Just a disaster and there was little government or industry could have done to
prevent it
3. The result of a government failure to properly regulate the oil and gas industry
4. The result of British Petroleum’s careless business practices
5. Don’t know/note sure
6. Refused
Please tell me if you think the oil spill has had a great, moderate, little, or no affect at all
on the following industries.
The fishing and seafood industry
1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not too effective
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
The oil and gas industry
1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not too effective
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
The service and tourism industry
1. Very effective
2. Somewhat effective
3. Not too effective
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being no impact and 5 being the highest impact, how much of
an impact do you think the oil spill had on you? {Enter exact number; enter 6 if don’t
know; enter 7 if refused.}
Demographic Questions
Would you say that in general your health is:
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Don’t know/not sure
6. Refused
How long have you lived in your community?
1. Less than 1 year
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

1-5 years
6-10 years
11-20 years
More than 20 years
Your whole life
Don’t know/not sure
Refused

Do you currently live in a residence that you own or are renting?
1. Own
2. Rent
3. Neither
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Refused
What type of housing structure do you currently live in? Is it a:
1. Single family home
2. Multi-family home or duplex
3. Apartment or condominium
4. Mobile home
5. Other --- specify
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
Do you currently have homeowner or renter’s insurance?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know/not sure
4. Refused
Which of the following information sources or social media do you use to obtain
information or communicate with family, friends, and officials? {Select all that apply.}
1. Email
2. Facebook
3. Twitter
4. Internet
5. Text messaging
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
What influences you the most when making decisions? Would you say:
1. Your morals and beliefs
2. Your family and friends
3. Your religion or beliefs
4. The law
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5. Other --- specify
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
What do you consider to be your political ideology, would you say:
1. Very liberal
2. Somewhat liberal
3. Moderate
4. Somewhat conservative
5. Very conservative
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
How often do you attend church services?
1. At least once a week
2. A couple times a month
3. A couple times a year
4. Almost never
5. Don’t attend church services
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
What was the last grade in school you completed?
1. Grades 11th or less
2. Completed high school or 12th grade equivalent
3. Some college
4. Completed college
5. Some graduate work
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Refused
I am going to read some income categories, stop me when I get to the one that best
describes your total 2010 household income from all sources before taxes.
1. Below $20,000
2. $20,000 to $50,000
3. $50,000 to $75,000
4. $75,000 to $100,000
5. $100,000 to $125,000
6. $125,000 to $150,000
7. $150,000 to $175,000
8. $175,000 to $200,000
9. Above $200,000
10. Don’t know/not sure
11. Refused
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In what year were you born? {Enter last two digits for year; enter 0 if born before 1901;
enter 98 if don’t know; enter 99 if refused.}
Are you currently:
1. Married
2. Member of an unmarried couple living together
3. Single (never married)
4. Separated
5. Divorced
6. Widowed
7. Don’t know/not sure
8. Refused
Including yourself, how many adults, 18 years of age or older, live in your household?
{Enter exact amount, none is 0.}
How many children under 18 years of age live in your household? {Enter exact amount,
none is 0.}
What is your race?
1. White or Caucasian
2. Black or African American
3. American Indian or Native Alaskan
4. Asian
5. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander
6. Respondent indicates multi-racial
7. Respondent indicates some other race
8. Don’t know/not sure
9. Refused
Do you consider yourself of Hispanic or Latino ethnicity?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know/not sure
4. Refused
What is your gender? {If you cannot tell the gender of the respondent, ask now.}
1. Male
2. Female
3. Don’t know/not sure
4. Refused
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POPULATION SUMMARY TABLES
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Race - “What is your race?”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-2473)
N
Chi /
Characteristic
White
Black
Other
Size
Gamma
Total
53.5
11.1
35.4
State
Alabama
272
13.5
23.1
3.4
Florida
620
30.7
22.0
17.5
.000 /
Louisiana
313
14.0
19.9
8.3
.408
Mississippi
271
15.1
17.7
2.6
Texas
998
26.8
17.3
68.1
Gender
Male
1167
47.9
46.0
46.6
.770 /
Female
1304
52.1
54.0
53.4
.023
Age
18-24 Years
329
12.1
16.6
15.8
25-44 Years
771
33.3
39.9
29.8
.000 /
45-64 Years
857
35.3
32.8
38.9
-.055
65+ Years
399
19.3
10.7
15.5
Education
Less than High School
320
9.1
13.6
18.8
High School Graduate
752
29.2
39.6
30.0
.000 /
Some College
559
23.8
22.0
21.4
-.175
College Graduate and Above 823
37.9
24.9
29.7
Income
Below $20,000
528
22.5
40.0
34.3
.000 /
$20,000 to $50,000
458
24.2
33.3
23.2
-.201
Above $50,000
855
53.3
26.7
42.5
Ideology
Liberal
482
17.2
30.5
26.2
.000 /
Moderate
603
27.1
28.1
27.4
-.167
Conservative
1122
55.7
41.4
46.5
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know/not sure” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
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Education - “What was the last grade in school you completed?”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-2515)
N
Size

Less
than
High
School
12.9

High
School
Graduate
30.6

College
Graduate
Some
and
College Above
22.7
33.8

Chi /
Gamma

Characteristic
Total
State
Alabama
278 10.2
14.0
10.9
8.8
Florida
633 18.2
22.0
27.0
29.4
.000 /
Louisiana
315 17.0
14.1
9.1
11.6
-.006
Mississippi
271 12.7
11.7
10.9
9.2
Texas
1018 42.0
38.1
42.1
40.9
Race
White
1309 37.2
50.8
55.8
60.3
.000 /
Black
273
11.6
14.4
10.7
8.3
-.175
Other
872
51.3
34.8
33.5
31.5
Gender
Male
1182 53.7
48.8
38.1
48.9
.000 /
Female
1331 46.3
51.2
61.9
51.1
.043
Age
18-24 Years
331
20.8
18.2
20.3
2.9
25-44 Years
781
19.9
27.8
32.2
42.4
.000 /
45-64 Years
876
37.2
37.2
31.1
39.4
.033
65+ Years
406
22.1
16.8
16.5
15.4
Income
Below $20,000
537
66.3
37.3
27.0
7.7
.000 /
$20,000 to $50,000
460
13.9
32.7
31.5
17.5
.568
Above $50,000
867
19.8
30.0
41.5
74.8
Ideology
Liberal
491
21.7
20.6
26.7
19.7
.011 /
Moderate
612
32.2
25.0
25.6
28.5
.012
Conservative
1146 46.1
54.5
47.7
51.8
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know/not sure” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
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Income - “I am going to read some income categories, stop me when I get to the one that
best describes your total 2010 household income from all sources before taxes.”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-1866)
$20,000
Below
to
Above
N
Chi /
Characteristic
$20,000 $50,000 $50,000 Gamma
Size
Total
28.8
24.6
46.6
State
Alabama
192
12.3
12.4
7.9
Florida
466
23.0
28.3
24.4
.001 /
Louisiana
229
11.0
14.2
12.1
.068
Mississippi
204
11.5
12.2
9.9
Texas
774
42.2
32.9
45.6
Race
White
975
41.5
51.5
60.8
.000 /
Black
210
15.9
15.3
6.5
-.201
Other
656
42.6
33.2
32.6
Gender
Male
888
39.8
50.1
51.2
.000 /
Female
977
60.2
49.9
48.8
-.149
Age
18-24 Years
224
18.3
13.5
7.7
25-44 Years
640
24.8
35.2
41.3
.000 /
45-64 Years
695
37.4
34.1
40.5
-.037
65+ Years
271
19.5
17.2
10.6
Education
Less than High School
252
31.1
7.6
5.8
High School Graduate
557
38.7
39.6
19.3
.000 /
Some College
419
21.0
28.7
20.1
.568
College Graduate and Above 636
9.1
24.1
54.9
Ideology
Liberal
361
24.2
27.5
16.3
.000 /
Moderate
460
25.5
27.9
27.4
.125
Conservative
881
50.3
44.6
56.3
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know/not sure” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
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Ideology - “What do you consider to be your political ideology, would you say:”
(Percentage responding by all people surveyed by column, N-2261)
ModConserN
Chi /
Characteristic
Liberal
erate
vative
Size
Gamma
Total
21.8
27.3
50.9
State
Alabama
240
9.9
10.0
11.2
Florida
572
22.1
31.9
23.1
.000 /
Louisiana
286
14.0
13.0
11.9
.001
Mississippi
256
9.7
9.4
13.0
Texas
908
44.3
35.7
40.7
Race
White
1183
42.1
53.2
58.7
.000 / Black
249
15.8
11.6
9.2
.167
Other
775
42.1
35.2
32.1
Gender
Male
1085
42.6
49.9
49.3
.023 /
Female
1174
57.4
50.1
50.7
-.072
Age
18-24 Years
296
17.3
17.3
10.2
25-44 Years
699
33.8
34.0
30.8
.000 /
45-64 Years
814
36.2
30.6
42.1
.134
65+ Years
323
12.7
18.0
17.0
Education
Less than High School
267
11.8
14.1
10.7
High School Graduate
661
27.7
27.0
31.4
.011 /
Some College
520
28.3
21.7
21.6
.012
College Graduate and Above 801
32.2
37.3
36.2
Income
Below $20,000
459
30.7
25.4
26.2
.000 /
$20,000 to $50,000
426
32.4
25.9
21.6
.125
Above $50,000
817
36.8
48.7
52.2
Note: The tests do not include those who responded “Don’t know/not sure” or those who
“Refused” to answer the question.
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